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4 
Summary 
 
In Norway, a gender wage gap persists despite its reputation for being one of 
the most gender equal countries in the world. Over the last 20 years women’s 
education levels have been on the rise and today the majority of students in 
Norwegian institutions of higher education are women. Yet, the gender wage 
gap has not significantly shrunk in this period. Still today working women are 
paid 14% less than working men. Unequal pay between women and men 
remains a persistent challenge for Norway if it is to fulfil its optimistic 
reputation. Achieving equal pay between women and men and eradicating pay 
discrimination is inextricably linked with the pursuit of gender equality in 
society at large.   
 
The principle of equal pay for work of equal value demands that men and 
women receive equal pay for the same work or for work of equal value. This 
principle was first laid out by the International Labour Organisation in its Equal 
Remuneration Convention, No. 100 of 1951. The principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value is concerned with the eradication of pay discrimination 
based on sex.   
 
This thesis explores what the principle for equal pay for work of equal value 
requires and how it addresses the gender wage gap in Norway. It further 
examines the implementation of the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value through two key national mechanisms; The Gender Equality Act’s 
complaints mechanism and the system of collective bargaining. Based on this a 
recommendation is presented aimed at increasing cooperation between these 
two mechanisms in the effort to strengthen the implementation of the principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value, in the system of collective bargaining. 
Overall, the aim of this thesis is to add to existing knowledge and 
recommendations on how to further narrow the gender wage gap in Norway.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background and context 
 
"I do not demand equal pay for any women save those who do equal work in 
value. Scorn to be coddled by your employers; make them understand that you 
are in their service as workers, not as women." (Susan B. Anthony)1 
  
When men and women perform work that is the same or of equal value they 
have a right to receive equal pay. Equal pay for work of equal value is a 
recognized human right to which all men and women are entitled.  
 
The fight for equality and non-discrimination forms one of the major struggles 
of human rights law and international labour law. Equality is considered a 
necessary component of social justice.2 Equality and non-discrimination 
constitutes the main subject of widely ratified human rights treaties such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women3 
and forms an inseparable component of most human rights treaties as well as 
national constitutions.4 The elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation forms part of the fundamental principles and rights 
at work.5  
 
The right to equal pay for work of equal value, also referred to as the equal pay 
principle, is a concept that has been acknowledged by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) since its conception in 1919. The principle is set out in the 
opening lines of the ILO Constitution, which recognises the principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value as a fundamental element of social justice.6 The 
International Labour Organisation’s Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 
(No.100)7 was the first international instrument promoting the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value. This Convention and its corresponding 
                                                
1 Susan B Anthony lived from 1820-1906, she was an American publisher, civil rights activist, 
editor, women’s rights activist and journalist. Quote and information taken from The 
Biography.com website: <http://www.biography.com/people/susan-b-anthony-194905> 
accessed 18 May 2015 
2 Ilmar Tammelo, Justice and Doubt: An Essay on the Fundamentals of Justice (Springer- 
Verlag Wien GmbH 1959) p. 333. 
3 Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 December 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 
4 See, for example, art 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3  
5 ILO, Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work, 18 June 1998  
6 Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, 1 April 1919 
7 ILO, Equal Remuneration Convention (C100) 29 June 1951 
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Recommendation, 1951 (No 90)8 has provided a basis from which the principle 
of equal pay in international, regional and domestic law has developed. The 
principle is also reflected in Norway’s Gender Equality Act first adopted in 
1978, which applies to all areas of social activities.   
 
The principle of equal pay for work of equal value is concerned with the 
elimination of pay discrimination. This principle needs to be implemented if 
equality is to be promoted and pay discrimination is to be addressed 
effectively.9 This is a premise on which this thesis is based.   
 
Despite advancements made towards gender equality and equal opportunities 
for all, especially in the last century, unequal pay between men and women and 
gender discrimination is a persistent problem in all countries. When women 
first entered the labour market, paying women lower wages than men was, in 
many countries, a systematic and intentional policy. This reflected the 
perception that men were the primary “breadwinners” while women were only 
“secondary earners”, as their role was primarily within the home. Even though 
this intentionally discriminatory policy is almost completely eradicated today it 
has left traces on the labour market perpetuating a chronic unequal pay disease. 
Many jobs are still dominated by women and considered of “female character”. 
The socialisation process leads many women and men to make stereotypical 
choices about their education, careers and family life. Due to historical and 
stereotypical attitudes towards the role of women, there is a downward pressure 
on wages in female dominated professions. As a result, women’s average pay 
continues to be lower than men’s in all countries and for all levels of education, 
age groups and occupations.10  
 
In this way the gender wage gap touches on two main problems that call for 
action. The first is the difference in pay between men and women that is related 
to the way the labour market is structured. The second is the difference in pay 
between men and women that is contrary to the principle of equal pay for work 
of equal value, i.e. pay discrimination. As we shall see, these two problems are 
very interrelated. Gender pay differences that pertain to certain structures in the 
labour market can also be considered discriminatory and contrary to the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value. An example is pay structures 
that systematically undermine female dominated work.  
 
Nonetheless, there is a distinction to be made between these two problems and 
what should be understood is that the fight for equal pay requires two main sets 
of action. Firstly, action that addresses pay discrimination, i.e. correcting wage 
differences that are contrary to the principle of equal pay. Secondly, actions 
                                                
8 ILO, Equal Remuneration Recommendation (C90) 29 June 1951 
9 Martin Oelz, Shauna Olney, Manuela Tomei, Equal Pay: An introductory guide (ILO 2013) 
piii 
10 ibid. p.3 
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directed at structural and sociological change, such as changing stereotypical 
attitudes towards gender roles, realising equal opportunities for men and 
women in education and at work and also achieving gender balance in relation 
to family responsibilities.11 Even though these two aspects are closely linked 
and interrelate, it is the first problem this thesis primarily seeks to address in the 
context of Norway’s gender wage gap. i.e. pay discrimination contrary to the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value.   
 
Even in Norway, a country considered to be one of the most gender equal in the 
world, unequal pay remains a persistent problem. Although, the gender wage 
gap is considerably lower in Norway than in many European countries, women 
still earn about 14% less than men per hour. This is a significant gap 
considering women have made great leaps in educational investment. For the 
last quarter of a century women have made up the majority of students at 
colleges and universities. The gender wage gap in Norway is structural, in that 
it follows gender segregation in the labour market but as we shall see some 
wage differences between men and women can be considered discriminatory 
and contrary to the principle of equal pay for work of equal value.  
 
Despite the principle of equal pay for work of equal value being incorporated 
into national legislation a gender wage gap persists and pay discrimination has 
not been eradicated. Examining the implementation of the principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value in the Norwegian context can therefore lead to 
useful knowledge on how to better apply the principle and ultimately narrow 
the gender wage gap.  
 
An Equal Pay Commission, appointed by the Norwegian cabinet in 2006, 
published a comprehensive study on the equal pay problem in Norway. The 
study was published in 2008 with the title Gender and Pay: Facts, analyses and 
measures to promote equal pay.12 It provides a very holistic overview of the 
equal pay problem in Norway and also recommends some measures to reduce 
pay differences. It is hoped that this thesis amounts to an additional contribution 
to and an expansion of the research undertaken by the Equal Pay Commission. 
 
 
1.2. Purpose of thesis 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore what the principle for equal pay for 
work of equal value requires and how it addresses the gender wage gap in 
                                                
11 Stortingsmelding nr 6 (2010-2011) Likestilling for Likelønn. Oslo: Barne- og Likestillings- og 
Inkluderingsdepartementet  
12 Likelønnskommisjonen, NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn  (referred to in this thesis as the Gender 
and Pay report) 
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Norway. It further purports to examine the implementation of the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value through two key national mechanisms; The 
Gender Equality Act’s complaints mechanism and the system of collective 
bargaining. 
 
Based on this research a recommendation is presented, which is aimed at 
increasing cooperation between these two mechanisms in the effort to 
strengthen the implementation of the equal pay principle in the collective 
bargaining system.  
 
Overall, the aim of the thesis is to add to existing knowledge and 
recommendations on how to further narrow the gender wage gap in Norway.  
 
1.3. Research questions 
 
To this end, the thesis seeks to answer the following key research questions: 
What does the principle of equal pay for work of equal value require and how 
does it address the gender wage gap in Norway? How well is the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value implemented by the complaints mechanism 
and within the system of collective bargaining? How can implementation of the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value in Norway be improved? 
 
1.4. Delimitations  
 
As stated above, pay differences between women and men can be seen as both a 
structural problem and a pay discrimination problem. Addressing these 
differences thus calls for a multifaceted approach. This thesis is primarily 
concerned with addressing pay differences between men and women that can be 
explained by pay discrimination contrary to the principle of equal pay for work 
of equal value, rather than changing the structures of the labour market as such. 
With this said, these are very interrelated problems. Therefore, the discussion at 
times touches on this relationship and thereby acknowledges that the fight for 
equal pay also requires efforts that go beyond the implementation of the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value.   
 
The thesis further delimits what aspects of the gender wage gap it seeks to 
address. Some pay differences fall outside the scope of pay discrimination and 
can be described more firmly as structural problems. For example, more men 
than women are found in management positions and women are concentrated 
lower down in the employment hierarchy. This aspect of the gender wage gap is 
more concerned with social attitudes, the choices of men and women as well as 
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opportunity equality rather than pay discrimination as such. This issue therefore 
falls outside the focus of this thesis. The thesis identifies the concentration of 
women in low paid professions as a focus point and how the principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value relates to this problem. As the focus is on pay 
discrimination contrary to the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, 
the thesis does not delve into any in-depth discussion of why women are 
concentrated in low paid professions and more generally why the labour market 
in Norway is gender segregated. It may briefly touch upon such questions but it 
accepts the current situation of the labour market as a point of departure and the 
focus is on what can be done with the current wage differences in light of the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value.  
 
The thesis does not deal with every institutional mechanism that has a bearing 
on the implementation of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value in 
Norway. This thesis focuses primarily on the implementation of the equal pay 
principle by two key mechanisms, namely the Gender Equality Act's complaints 
mechanism and the system of collective bargaining. The complaints 
mechanism, made up by the Equality and anti-discrimination Ombud and the 
Equality and anti-discrimination Tribunal, handles individual equal pay 
complaints at the national level and is the central mechanism in developing 
legal practice in relation to equal pay at the national level. In Norway wages are 
determined primarily through collective bargaining agreements between 
workers and employers. The focus will be on these two mechanisms because 
they are of great significance to the practical implementation of equal pay for 
work of equal value in Norway. With this said, other relevant mechanisms, 
especially certain government initiatives, are discussed when related to the 
activities of these two key mechanisms.  
 
 
1.5. Method and Structure 
 
As already stated this thesis is premised on the idea that the principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value needs to be implemented if equality is to be 
promoted and pay discrimination is to be addressed effectively. The principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value thus forms a norm from which my 
argumentation follows. The thesis is primarily concerned with what the current 
state of the law is, as well as how it is implemented, and uses mainly legal 
sources to this end. This thesis therefore largely employs a legal dogmatic 
method, although elements of sociological as well as political perspectives also 
feature in the discussion.  
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Chapter One provides an account of the gender wage gap in Norway, which is 
primarily based on statistical evidence. It provides an explanation for why there 
is a gender wage gap in Norway and discusses the causes.  
 
Chapter Two gives an overview of the legal requirement of the equal pay 
principle as enshrined in International Labour Law and European Union Law. 
For International Labour Law the relevant convention, recommendation and 
statements by the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations are examined. The ILO Equal Pay Guide 
has also been consulted. For European Union Law the relevant Directive as 
well as case law from the European Court of Justice are the main materials 
utilised. How the principle of equal pay for work of equal value is reflected in 
Norwegian domestic law is explained along the way with reference to the 
relevant national legislation and their preparatory works. This chapter also 
serves to highlight how the principle of equal pay for work of equal value 
addresses the gender wage gap in Norway.  
 
Chapter Three evaluates the implementation of the equal pay principle by the 
Gender Equality Act’s complaints mechanism. To this end the case law of the 
Equality and anti-discrimination Ombud and the Equality and anti-
discrimination Tribunal are examined.   
 
Chapter Four discusses the implementation of the equal pay principle within the 
process of collective bargaining. A combination of different materials is used in 
this section. Main sources used are government reports, which are relevant to 
the work of the social partners in wage determination and equality issues. 
Supplementary sources include collective bargaining agreements and a 
statistical study on the social partner’s influence on the gender wage gap.  
 
Finally, Chapter Five draws out some central conclusions and a 
recommendation is discussed on how to strengthen the implementation of equal 
pay principle in the system of collective bargaining.     
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2 The Gender Wage Gap in Norway 
2.1. Introductory remarks 
 
The gender wage gap is well documented in Norway and the Equal Pay 
Commission undertook a particularly comprehensive study on the explanations 
for the gender wage gap using statistics from the national statistics agency in 
their Gender and Pay report. The explanations for the gender wage gap are 
multifaceted and rooted in a complex set of sociological and historical causes. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss all the various explanations and 
their causes in depth, but rather to provide a general overview of what the 
gender wage gap is and why there is a gender wage gap in Norway. In Norway 
it is not commonly the case that men and women with the same job and who 
work for the same employer receive unequal pay. Rather, the gender wage gap 
is structural and follows gender segregation in the labour market. As we shall 
see women and men are concentrated in very different parts of the labour 
market with consequences for the gender wage gap. Women are concentrated in 
relatively low paid professions, industries and sectors.  
 
2.2. Male and female participation in the labour 
market  
 
In Norway female labour market participation (women in paid employment) is 
high compared to other countries. Female labour market participation has been 
increasing since the 1970s when only about 45% of women were employed 
compared to 78% of men.13 In 2014 the difference was significantly smaller, 
66% of women were employed in comparison to 70% of men.14 The increase in 
female labour market participation has occurred in the context of the increase in 
women pursuing higher education as well as political developments, giving 
more opportunities to women with family responsibilities.15 However, a gap 
still persists meaning that more men are in paid employment than women.  
 
                                                
13  NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.39 
14 Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2015) Arbeidskraftundersøkelsen, 4. kvartal 2014. Taken from 
<http://ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/statistikker/aku> accessed 8 April 2015 
15 Erling Barth and Harald Dale-Olsen, ”Lønnsforskjellene mellom kvinner og menn i et 30 års 
perspektiv” in publication: Søkelys på Arbeidsmarkedet (Institutt for Samfunnsforskning 2004) 
p.71 
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Furthermore, women in Norway to a much larger extent than men, work part-
time instead of full hours. In 2014, 38% of employed women were part-time 
workers, while only 14% of employed men.16 This must be seen in the context 
of traditional expectations of women in relation to family responsibilities. 
While extensive part-time employment can be a big contributor to high female 
labour market participation, the fact that there are such a disproportionate 
number of women in part-time employment suggests that there is still a social 
expectation that the woman is the primary care person in the family while the 
man is the main provider.17 
 
The Norwegian labour market is also very gender segregated. According to the 
OECD the Norwegian labour market is one of the most gender segregated in the 
world.18 Segregation occurs along both vertical and horizontal axes. By vertical 
segregation it is meant that women and men are placed in different positions in 
the employment hierarchy. Far more men than women are found in 
management positions. By horizontal segregation it is meant that women and 
men are concentrated in different professions, industries and sectors. One main 
separation is that far more women work in the public sector, while men 
dominate in the private sector.19  
 
The difference between men and women in the degree and areas of labour 
market participation is the result of a mixture of personal preferences, gender 
role expectations, the organisation of the labour market and economic needs. 
These are structures with historical causes that have, to a certain extent, 
managed to persevere despite huge advancements in gender equality more 
generally. The wage gap between men and women in Norway can be explained 
by some of these structures.  
 
2.3. The gender wage gap  
2.3.1. The gross gender wage gap 
 
The term “gender wage gap” used throughout this thesis, means the difference 
between men and women’s wages adjusted for working time. It is the hourly 
wage of women and men that is compared and not the overall wage income of 
men and women. It is this gender wage gap that is of interest in this paper.  
When we compare the wages adjusted for working time of all employed men 
                                                
16 ibid.  
17 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn p.47 
18 ibid. p.140 
19 ibid. p.141-142 
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and women, women in Norway earn about 86% of men’s wages. Women thus 
earn 14% less than men on an hourly basis.20 This number constitutes the gross 
gender wage gap.  
 
Between the early 1970s until the 1980s the gender wage gap was significantly 
reduced. This must be seen in the context of an increase in the level of 
education for women and an expansion of the public sector creating many new 
jobs for women. After the mid 1980s the gender wage gap has stood more or 
less still fluctuating at around 15%,21 even though female education levels have 
increased in this period.22 How can this persistent gap be explained? 
 
In a country known for its advancement in the field of gender equality, it might 
easily be assumed that this gender wage gap of 14% is either statistically 
insignificant or explainable through completely objective factors that ought to 
be left alone. On a closer look, however, a more ominous picture emerges, 
which from the perspective of pay equality is problematic.  
 
 
2.3.2. Level of education 
 
From the 80s female education levels have increased without this having had 
any significant effect on the gender wage gap. Indeed, in Norway today more 
women than men have education of more than four years beyond high school,23 
yet women earn 14% less than men. When comparing only women and men 
with the same level of education a gender wage gap still persists. The gender 
gap is actually the widest among the most highly educated men and women. 
Statistics from 2005 showed that in groups with up to 4 years higher education 
the gender wage gap was about 20%, while in groups with more than 4 years 
higher education it was about 18%.24 Therefore, we cannot explain the gender 
wage gap through a difference between men and women in education levels. 
Women are receiving less remuneration in return for investment in personal 
resources.  
 
                                                
20 Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2015) Lønn, alle ansatte, 2014. Taken from <http://ssb.no/arbeid-og-
lonn/statistikker/lonnansatt> accessed 8 April 2015 
21 see NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.52, table 4.2 
22 Erling Barth and Harald Dale-Olsen, ”Lønnsforskjellene mellom kvinner og menn i et 30 års 
perspektiv”, in publication: Søkelys på Arbeidsmarkedet (Institutt for Samfunnsforskning 2004) 
p.71 
23 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn p.58 table 4.7 
24ibid. 
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2.3.3. Generational perspective  
 
Women entered the labour market later than men and it was only about 20 years 
ago that they started participating, on par with men, in higher education. As 
such, women and men in the labour force today represent two different 
generations. It is therefore not surprising that the gender wage gap is wider 
between men and women of older age. For male and female workers below 29 
years old the gender wage gap is 6% compared to 18% for workers between 55 
and 60 years old.25  
 
If the generational perspective accounts for this difference it is positive from an 
equal pay perspective because it suggests that young men and women workers 
in a more gender equal society are phasing out inequalities in pay with time. 
However, it is doubtful whether the generational perspective provides a full 
explanation. The Equal Pay Commission suggests in its Gender and Pay report, 
using a statistical study on the wage development for women and men,26 that 
the main reason for the difference is not that the labour force is made up of two 
different generations, rather it is the case that salaries increase at a higher rate 
for men than for women throughout their lifecycle regardless of any 
generational effect. This suggests that women have a weaker career 
development than men. It is not clear from this what the reasons for this are, 
suffice to say that the generational perspective does not provide a satisfactory 
explanation for why there is a gender wage gap in Norway.    
 
2.3.4. The gender wage gap and gender segregation in 
the labour market  
 
The gender wage gap cannot be explained by women and men having different 
levels of education, nor does the generational perspective offer a satisfactory 
explanation. In Norway the gender wage gap follows gender segregation in the 
labour market. That the Norwegian labour market is gender segregated means 
than women and men work in different positions, professions, industries and 
sectors. While women mostly dominate in the public sector and in care 
professions, men dominate in the private sector and in technical professions. 
Gender segregation in the labour market has significant consequences for the 
wage spread between women and men and it is the main explanation for the 
gender wage gap today. 
 
                                                
25 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.61 
26 Erling Barth and Pål Schøne, ”Undersøkelser av lønnsforskjeller mellom kvinner og menn” 
(Institutt for Samfunnsforskning 2006) 
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Vertical segregation 
 
By vertical segregation it is meant that women and men in Norway are placed 
differently in the employment hierarchy. More men than women are found 
higher up in the employment hierarchy, in leadership or management positions. 
This has obvious consequences for the gender wage gap. Although women 
make up almost half of the work force, only one out of three leaders are 
women. In the private sector 74% of those in managerial positions are men.27 
An in-depth discussion on the causes of this unequal distribution goes beyond 
the purpose of this paper, suffice to say that personal preference, the 
socialisation process and expectations relating to family responsibilities are 
likely to be significant contributing causes.28    
 
Horizontal segregation  
 
By horizontal segregation is meant that women and men in Norway work in 
different professions, industries and sectors. Women make up around 70% of 
employees in the public sector while men, about 68%, dominate in the private 
sector. Local government29 forms part of the public sector and has a particularly 
heavy concentration of women, about 78%.30 In local government we find 
heavily female dominated professions, especially the care professions.  
 
Average wage in the private sector is higher than in the public sector and with a 
wider wage structure. Thus highly educated workers in the private sector 
receive more in remuneration for their education than in the public sector where 
the wage structure is more compressed. This helps to explain why the gender 
wage gap is especially wide among women and men with higher education; 
most of the highly educated women work in the public sector.  
 
Still, even within each sector, a gender wage gap persists. The gap was at about 
16% in the private sector and about 12% in the public sector in 2006.31 Thus the 
public-private divide cannot explain the whole gender wage gap. Even within 
the sectors, men and women are found in different positions and are 
concentrated in different industries and professions.  
 
Women are concentrated in industries such as health care, social work and 
teaching, traditionally lower down on the pay scale, while men dominate in 
construction, oil, agriculture and metals, traditionally higher up on the pay 
scale. The most female dominated industry is the health authorities with 72% 
                                                
27 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.71 
28 ibid. p.143-145 
29 When reference is made to local government in Norway’s context what is being referred to 
are the municipalities 
30 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.41 
31 ibid. p.71, table. 4.16 
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women and the most male dominated industry is construction with 95% men.32 
Professions follow the same pattern. For example, among those with higher 
education women dominate among nurses, primary and preschool teachers 
while men dominate among engineers. Overall industries and professions in 
which there is a high concentration of women are remunerated less than 
industries and professions in which there is a high concentration of men. A 
study published by the Institute for Social Research in Norway found that there 
is a negative correlation between the concentration of women in a profession 
and the wage level of that profession.33 The study concerned women and men 
with the same level if education and potential work experience and showed that 
a profession with 10% more women than another profession has 1,7% lower 
wage.34 On the whole, female dominated work is remunerated lower. It is this 
aspect of the gender wage gap that will be in focus in this paper.  
 
2.4. Concluding remarks 
 
In Norway it is not normally the case that men and women with the same job 
and working for the same employer receive unequal pay. Yet, working women 
earn 14% less than working men. This wage difference cannot be explained by 
differences in levels of education between men and women and the generational 
perspective does not offer a satisfactory explanation either. The gender wage 
gap in Norway largely follows gender segregation in the labour market, both 
vertical and horizontal. Women and men in what has been proclaimed to be the 
most gender equal country in the world are still to a very large extent making 
traditional choices about their education and careers.  
 
Of course the equal pay challenge involves working with changing these 
attitudes and structures so that the labour market can eventually become less 
gender segregated, however that is not the focus of this thesis. Rather the author 
has chosen to focus on the other major equal pay challenge; namely correcting 
existing gender wage differences that are unacceptable in light of the principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value. In other words, the focus is on wage 
discrimination, especially in the context of horizontal gender segregation in the 
labour market. The fact that women are concentrated in low paid professions, 
industries and sectors can, as we shall see, constitute wage discrimination 
contrary to the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. In order to 
understand the relevance of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value 
to horizontal gender segregation in the labour market, it is necessary to 
                                                
32 ibid. p.41 
33 Erling Barth and Ragnhild Steen Jensen, ”Arbeidsvurdering for likelønn: Er det noen 
sammenheng?” In publication: Søkelys på arbeidsmarkedet (Institutt for Samfunnsforskning 
2005) p.141 
34 ibid.  
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understand what this principle requires. The following chapter provides an 
overview of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value.   
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3 The Principle of Equal Pay for 
work of equal value in International, 
Regional and Domestic Law 
3.1. Introductory remarks 
 
The principle of equal pay for men and women for work of equal value was set 
out in the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100),35 adopted by the ILO in 
1951. This convention as well as its corresponding Recommendation, 1951 
(No. 90)36 has provided a basis from which equal pay in international, regional 
and domestic law has developed.  
 
The principle of equal pay for men and women for work of equal value can be 
found in other important international and regional conventions. It appears in 
article 11(1)(d) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1981)37 and article 7(a) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).38 The principle of 
equality and the principle of equal pay are fundamental to the European Union. 
The principle of equal pay for work of equal value is enshrined in article 157(3) 
of the Lisbon Treaty39 and clarified in equal treatment directive 2006/54/EC.40  
 
Norway is bound by all the abovementioned instruments but for the purpose of 
this chapter, it is the principle of equal pay for work of equal value as enshrined 
in International Labour Law and EU Law, which will be elaborated on. How 
Norwegian domestic law corresponds to these obligations will be presented 
along the way. The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of what the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value requires. It should also become 
clearer in what way this principle is relevant to addressing the gender wage gap 
in Norway, which follows horizontal gender segregation in the labour market. 
The picture that emerges is that persisting wage differences in Norway that 
pertain to the concentration of women in low paid professions, industries and 
sectors can in some circumstances be contrary to the principle of equal pay.  
                                                
35 ILO, Equal Remuneration Convention (C100) 29 June 1951 
36 ILO, Equal Remuneration Recommendation (C90) 29 June 1951 
37 CEDAW art 11(1)(d) 
38 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art 7(a) 
39 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012) OJ 
C326, art 157(3) (ex art 141 EC) 
40 Council Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, 
OJ L204/23 (Directive 2006/54/EC) 
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3.2. General obligations 
3.2.1. International Labour Law and EU Law 
 
Norway ratified ILO’s Convention 100 in 195941 and is thereby bound by its 
equal pay standards. Norway is bound by the EU standards on equal pay as a 
member of the European Economic Area (EEA). What obligations this 
generates for Norway will be mapped out below with reference to the ILO 
Convention and Recommendation on equal remuneration as well as EU’s Equal 
Treatment Directive.  
 
Both legal texts promote the principle of equal pay for work of equal value and 
defines this as remuneration without discrimination based on sex. Convention 
No. 100 requires member states to “promote” and “ensure” the application “to 
all workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers 
for work of equal value”.42 It allows for flexibility in the manner of promoting 
and ensuring application43 and, as stated in Recommendation 90, the principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value is to be “promoted or ensured by means 
appropriate to the methods in operation for determining rates of 
remuneration.”44 
 
Recommendation 90 elaborates on when member states are obligated to 
“ensure” the application of the principle. The duty to “ensure” the application 
of the Convention’s principles applies vis-á-vis workers in occupations in 
which wage determination is in direct control by the government or where it is 
subject to statutory regulation or public control.45 The Convention also calls for 
provision to be made by legal enactment for the general application of the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value. The Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (Committee of Experts) 
have stated that where national legislation provides for this, the state is in a 
legal position to enforce the principle and thus responsible for ensuring its 
application to all workers under article 2(1) of the convention.46  
 
It is important to stress that equal pay for work of equal value is not a gender 
equality goal that exists in isolation. Wage disparities between women and men 
                                                
41 NORMLEX, Ratifications for Norway, accessed 11 March 2015 
42 C100 art 1 
43 C100 art 2 
44 Recommendation 90 Preamble  
45 Recommendation 90 art 1, 2 
46 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General 
Survey of the Reports on the Equal Remuneration Convention (No.100) and Recommendation 
(No.90), 1951, International Labour Conference, 72nd Session, 1986, 
para. 28 (emphasis added) 
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exist in the wider context of historical and structural discrimination of women 
in the labour market and in society more generally. As such, Recommendation 
90 places the principle of equal pay for work of equal value within this wider 
context. It calls for action to be taken to raise the productive efficiency of 
women workers through equal treatment and opportunities at work more 
generally. This includes equality in vocational training opportunities and access 
to employment as well as the provision of welfare and social services that meet 
the needs of women workers.47  
 
Directive 2006/54/EC also deals with the equal treatment and opportunities of 
men and women in matters of employment and occupation more generally. It 
contains provisions not just on equal pay, but on “Equal treatment in 
occupational social security schemes”48 as well as “Equal treatment as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working 
conditions.”49 Other complimentary directives on the topic of gender equality 
include Directive 92/8550 regarding pregnant workers and workers who have 
recently given birth or are breastfeeding as well as Directive 2010/1851 on 
parental leave, which lays down minimum requirements designed to facilitate 
the reconciliation of parental and professional responsibilities for working 
parents.  
 
Although this paper focuses on the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value, i.e. on eliminating pay discrimination, in order to address the gender 
wage gap, efforts must also be made to tackle discrimination of women in the 
labour market more generally. Eliminating existing pay discrimination is one 
element of the fight for pay equality.   
 
3.2.2. Domestic law 
 
In Norway provision for the general application of the equal pay principle is 
made through the Gender Equality Act, which first entered into force in 1979.52 
It applies to all areas of social activity. The state is, as such, responsible for 
                                                
47 Convention No.111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 
was adopted by the ILO on 25 June 1958 and entered into force 15 June 1960. It is one of ILO’s 
fundamental Conventions and promotes equal opportunity and treatment in respect of 
employment and occupation more generally. It prohibits discrimination based on race, colour, 
sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin. It thereby adresses wider 
aspects of discrimination and must be seen in complement to Convention No. 100 on equal pay.  
48 Directive 2006/54/EC Chapter 2 
49 Directive 2006/54/EC Chapter 3 
50 Directive 92/85/EEC 
51 Directive 2010/18/EU 
52 Likestillingsloven 2013, note: the act has, since first coming into force in 1979, been 
amended on several occasions. Reference to the act in this paper is the act in its latest form from 
2013, which includes all amendments that have been made in the past.  
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ensuring the application of the equal pay principle to all workers. The purpose 
of the Gender Equality Act is to promote gender equality and non-
discrimination, with particular emphasis on bettering the position of women in 
society.53 It contains a special provision on the right to equal pay for work of 
equal value.54  
 
The Gender Equality Act also promotes equal treatment of men and women in 
the context of employment and occupation more generally. In addition to §21 
on equal pay, the act contains provisions on equal treatment in relation to 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion55 and gives special 
protections to worker’s that take parental leave.56  
 
Public authorities, workers and employers organisations as well as all 
employers are obligated to actively, targeted and systematically work towards 
promoting the principles of the act in their respective activities.57 Thus, all 
institutions, which are of significance for the determination of wages in 
Norway, are bound by the equal pay obligations arising from the Gender 
Equality Act. They are not only under a negative obligation not to discriminate, 
but also under a positive obligation to actively implement measures in 
promotion of the principles of the act.  
 
The enforcement of this act is provided for by the The Equality and Anti-
discrimination Ombud and The Equality and Anti-discrimination Tribunal. I 
return to their role and practice in a later chapter.  
 
 
3.3. The principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value 
3.3.1. International Labour Law and EU Law 
 
What equal pay for work of equal value actually means is not specified in the 
wording of either Convention 100 or directive 2006/54/EC. The wording of the 
legal texts in combination with statements by ILO’s Committee of Experts as 
well as jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice has been reviewed in 
this section in order to provide a general interpretation of the principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value.   
                                                
53 Ibid. §1 
54 ibid. §21 
55 ibid. §17 
56 ibid. §18 
57 ibid. §12 and §14 
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The term remuneration is clearly defined and is of broad scope and covers, in 
both Convention 100 and Directive 2006/54/EC, “the ordinary, basic or 
minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable 
directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind by the employer to the worker 
and arising out of the worker’s employment.”58  
 
Equal pay for work of equal value means rates of remuneration established 
without discrimination based on sex.59 Thus a wage difference is contrary to the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value if the wage is set in such a way 
that it is discriminatory on grounds of sex. This implies of course, that where 
there are objective reasons for a relative wage difference that is not 
discriminatory, this is not contrary to the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value.  
 
3.3.2. Domestic law 
 
The starting point for the principle of equal pay for work of equal value is the 
same in Norwegian domestic law. §21(1) of the Gender Equality Act states that 
“women and men shall have equal pay for the same work or for work of equal 
value and that this means remuneration is to be established in the same way for 
men and women, without regard to sex.”(Author’s translation).60  
 
Remuneration is defined as “all ordinary remuneration for work plus any 
additional payments or advantages or other emoluments granted by the 
employer”(Author’s translation).61  
 
 
3.4. Work of equal value and objective job 
evaluation 
 
                                                
58 C100 art 1(a)  
59 C100 art 1(b) and directive 2006/54/EC art 4 
60 Likestillingsloven 2013, §21(1): “Kvinner og menn i samme virksomhet skal ha lik lønn for 
samme arbeid eller arbeid av like Verdi. Lønnen skal fastsettes på samme mate for kvinner og 
men uten hensyn til kjønn.” (original text from legislation) 
61 Likestillingsloven 2013, §21(4): “Med lønn menes det alminnelige arbeidsvederlag samt alle 
andre tillegg eller fordeler eller andre goder som ytes av arbeidsgiveren.” (original text from 
legislation) 
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3.4.1. International Labour Labour Law and EU Law  
 
The objective evaluation of jobs forms a component of the evaluation of equal 
pay for work of equal value. The purpose of this exercise is to objectively 
determine the relative value of different jobs using a method that is free from 
gender bias. It is meant to give an indication of how different jobs should be 
remunerated.  
  
What does objective evaluation of jobs mean? As a point of departure, some 
jobs that are completely different in content cannot be considered to be of equal 
value and are thus not required to receive equal pay. A doctor will be paid more 
than a hospital cleaning staff. Without making any judgment about the societal 
usefulness of these two jobs, their content contains some obvious differences 
such as, educational requirements, level of responsibility and working 
conditions, which warrants different pay.  
 
However, some jobs are considered either to be the same or to be of equal 
value. When this is the case the equal pay principle is engaged. Where two jobs 
are the same, i.e. when the job description is identical, it is obvious that, as a 
point of departure, they are to be paid equally. However, where job content is 
very different this may not be as obvious. Yet the jobs may still be considered 
of equal value and thus might be entitled to receive equal pay.62 
 
Both Convention 100 and Directive 2006/54/EC call for a form of objective job 
evaluation for the purpose of determining wages free from discrimination based 
on sex. It is stated in Convention 100 that, “measures shall be taken to promote 
the objective appraisal of jobs on the basis of the work to be performed.”63 This 
implies that it is the content of the job itself that is to be evaluated.64 The 
Committee of Experts has emphasised that, in the interest of objectivity, it is the 
job that is evaluated and not the person performing the job. Hence the 
characteristics of those performing the job, are not relevant in the evaluation. 
Factors that may enter into the evaluation may be skills, training and 
responsibilities required for the job, as well as the nature of the work and 
working conditions.65 The choice of factors and the comparison itself must be 
                                                
62 Martin Oelz, Shauna Olney, Manuela Tomei, Equal Pay: An introductory guide (ILO 2013) 
p.31 
63 C100 art 3(1) 
64 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General 
Survey of the Reports on the Equal Remuneration Convention (No.100) and Recommendation 
(No.90), 1951, International Labour Conference, 72nd Session, 1986, 
paras. 20, 21 
65 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General 
Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at work in light of the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, International Labour Converence, 101th 
Session, 2012, para. 695 
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free from any gender bias.66 It is thus, for example, important that certain 
factors are not presumed to be of lower value because they pertain to 
traditionally female work, for example skills required for providing care for 
people. If the objective job evaluation exercise is undertaken rigorously and 
objectively it means that work that is completely different can still be 
considered to be of equal value.    
 
Objective job evaluation is thus very important in addressing the aspect of the 
gender wage gap attributed to the concentration of women in low-paid 
professions, as the wages in these professions can often be associated with the 
requirement of traditionally female skills. Historical attitudes towards work that 
was traditionally performed by women, although less blatant in todays society, 
are still detectable and to some extent reflected in wages. It is important to have 
a mechanism, which challenges historical perceptions of the value of 
traditionally female work.  
 
As a starting point, all jobs can be objectively evaluated on the basis of their 
content and jobs that are not considered of equal value are not required to 
receive equal pay. However not all jobs that are the same or of equal value are 
required to receive the same pay either, i.e. the objective evaluation of the 
content of jobs is not the only factor to be considered in determining equal pay 
for work of equal value. If this were the case it would require evening out wage 
differences across the whole labour market without consideration of other 
factors. This is not the intention of the equal pay principle.  Rates of 
remuneration will only be contrary to the principle of equal pay when it is 
discriminatory on the basis of sex. We must therefore look more closely at how 
discrimination is established in the context of the principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value. Factors such as the reach of comparison between jobs, 
how direct and indirect discrimination are established and the use of objective 
justifications must feature in the evaluation. The following sections explore 
each of these factors in turn.  
 
3.4.2. Domestic law 
 
Domestic law follows the same logic on evaluating the objective value of jobs. 
The wording of §21(3) of the Gender Equality Act indicates that an objective 
evaluation of the content of jobs must be undertaken in order to determine their 
relative value. It states:  
 
Whether the work is of equal value is decided after an overall assessment 
where emphasis is placed on expertise required to perform the work and 
                                                
66 Directive 2006/54/EC art 4 
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other relevant factors, such as for example effort, responsibility and 
working conditions.67(Author’s translation)  
 
Thus it is the job content itself that is to be evaluated and if there are objective 
differences on this basis a corresponding wage difference will not be contrary 
to the principle of equal pay. The idea is that an objective evaluation of job 
content shall produce a determination of relative value free from gender bias.  
 
Norway has not developed any consistent national strategy or method on the 
implementation of objective job evaluation. There have been pilot projects in 
various sectors of the labour market, where jobs were categorised in a pay scale 
according to their objective value. One such project was the objective job 
evaluation tool FAKIS. This project did not lead to actual wage changes. A 
main criticism was that objective job evaluation alone did not take into account 
objective reasons for different pay such as market value or work performance. 
Thus whether wage differences actually amounted to pay discrimination was 
not considered. When the content of jobs were found to be of equal value, 
without consideration of whether there might be other objective factors 
justifying unequal pay, the method called for equalization of pay.  In the 
Norwegian wage determination context, where great importance is attached to 
free negotiation between the social partners, it was simply too radical.68  
 
The Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud as well as the Equality and Anti-
discrimination Tribunal have developed a legal practice on objective job 
evaluation in their capacity as a complaints mechanism for the Gender Equality 
Act. Contrary to the approach taken in the pilot projects, in their view the 
undertaking of objective job evaluation forms an element of a wider evaluation 
of discrimination. As established above, objective job evaluation in itself is not 
enough to determine whether the principle of equal pay for work of equal value 
has been breached. Just because jobs are of equal value based on their content, 
does not mean that a wage difference is necessarily contrary to the principle of 
equal pay. Since rates of remuneration will only be contrary to the principle of 
equal pay when it causes discrimination on the basis of sex, one must look 
further at how discrimination is established in the context of equal pay. This is 
exactly what the Ombud and Tribunal do and, as we shall see, this approach is 
more nuanced and allows room for consideration of other interests as well, also 
those that the employer may deem especially important.  
 
 
                                                
67 Likestillingsloven 2013, §21(3): “Om arbeidene er av lik Verdi, avgjøres etter en 
helhetsvurdering der det legges vekt på den kompetanse som er nødvendig for å utføre arbeidet 
og andre relevante faktorer, som for eksempel anstrengelse, ansvar og arbeidsforhold.” (original 
text) 
68 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p. 206 
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3.5. Reach of Comparison     
 
3.5.1. International labour law and EU law  
 
Who can compare their wages to who is key to the effectiveness of the 
application of the equal pay principle and both Convention 100 and directive 
2006/54/EC promotes a wide reach of comparison. 
 
The principle of equal pay for work of equal value requires comparison with an 
individual or group of the opposite sex. The equal pay principle promotes equal 
pay as between women and men workers and not any other groups, for example 
between migrant and native workers. There must be a gender element.  
 
Men and women are spread across the labour market but as we have seen, they 
are concentrated in different professions, industries and sectors. A reach of 
comparison, which takes this into account, is thus necessary for the principle to 
be effective to address the gender wage gap in the Norwegian labour market. 
According to the Committee of Experts, the reach of comparison between jobs 
should be as wide as allowed by the national wage fixing system.69 Comparison 
must be able to take place between jobs that are completely different. This 
includes jobs that belong to different professions and jobs that cut across 
occupational borders.70 Because women and men are concentrated in different 
jobs, their wages are often also regulated by different collective bargaining 
agreements. According to the European Court of Justice, comparison can take 
place also between jobs governed by different collective bargaining 
agreements.71  
 
But what about comparison between jobs in different enterprises, i.e. when jobs 
have different employers? Women and men are concentrated in different 
professions, industries and sectors. Consequently, they are also concentrated in 
different enterprises with different employers. The Preamble of Directive 
2006/54/EC states that according to the European Court of Justice “the 
principle of equal pay is not limited to situations in which men and women 
work for the same employer.”72 The ILO does not either restrict the principle of 
equal pay for work of equal value to work performed for the same employer. 
The Committee of Experts have stated: 
 
                                                
69 General Survey on Equal Remuneration (1986) para 22  
70 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, general 
observation on Convention No. 100, 2001    
71 Case C-127/92 Enderby (1993) 
72 Directive 2006/54/EC, preamble (emphasis added) 
 
28 
Application of the Convention’s principle is not limited to comparisons 
between men and women in the same establishment or enterprise. It 
allows for a much broader comparison to be made between jobs 
performed by men and women in different places or enterprises, or 
between different employers.73  
 
This stance is also detectible from the Committee of Expert’s observations to 
Norway on Convention 100. The body has repeatedly stressed this point in 
relation to the “same enterprise” limitation in the Norwegian legislation.  
 
However, the European Court of Justice has developed a legal rule to the effect 
that, the wages being compared need not necessarily concern workers for the 
same employer but the wages must nonetheless be attributable to a single 
source. This was established in the Lawrence case. The point made in Lawrence 
was that it must be possible to point to a single entity, which is responsible for 
the pay disparity in order for the equal pay principle to be enforceable. This 
might be the case for example where multiple enterprises are closely connected. 
Where this principle creates the most obvious barrier for comparison is between 
jobs in the public and purely private sector.   
 
3.5.2. Domestic law 
 
When it comes to the reach of comparison, the Norwegian legislation presents a 
notable limitation, which not only calls into question the law’s compatibility 
with international labour standards, but also its suitability to address pay 
disparities in the Norwegian gender segregated labour market where women 
dominate in low-paid professions, industries and sectors. §21 of Norway’s 
Gender Equality Act specifies that the right to equal pay for the same work or 
for work of equal value applies to women and men “in the same 
enterprise”(Author’s translation)74. According to the Act’s preparatory works, 
this is to be understood as men and women that work for the same employer.75 
 
This can be very problematic when seeking to address the gender wage gap in 
Norway as women and men are often concentrated in different enterprises. 
However, it is perhaps not as limiting as the wording first implies. A broad 
understanding of the word enterprise has been intended: the state is one 
                                                
73 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General 
Survey on the fundamental conventions concerning rights at work in light of the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, International Labour Converence, 101th 
Session, 2012, para. 697 
74 Likestillingsloven 2013, §21(1): ”Kvinner og menn i samme virksomhet skal ha lik lønn for 
samme arbeid eller arbeid av lik verdi.”(original text from legislation)(emphasis added) 
75 Ot.prp.nr.77 (2000-2001) p.53 
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employer as is each individual municipality.76 As entities they are responsible 
for the employment of a wide range of trades and occupations. Similarly private 
companies will still be regarded as one enterprise even though they are divided 
into various departments.77  
 
The legislation is obviously limiting in that it cannot be used to address wage 
differences across the public and private sector and the law does not catch pay 
differences between different enterprises in the private sector. This is of course 
unfortunate in light of the fact that women dominate to a large extent in the 
public sector while men dominate in the private sector. However, and as was 
observed in Chapter Two, the public private divide does not account for the 
whole gender wage gap. A gap still persists within each sector, thus part of the 
gender wage gap is still within the reach of the law.   
 
Despite the limitation to same employer it is explicitly stated in §21(2) of the 
Gender Equality Act that comparison is not limited to the same profession or 
collective bargaining agreement. Thus within the same enterprise, wage 
differences between men and women who belong to different professions and 
have their wage determined by different collective bargaining agreements fall 
under the scrutiny of the equal pay principle. The state is a large employer, 
which includes not only those that work directly for the government, but also 
state agencies78, of which even universities are considered an example. A wide 
range of jobs will fall under equal pay scrutiny.79 Municipalities are also 
responsible for the employment of a wide range of different jobs and 
professions with contrasting gender profiles, the employment of nurses and 
engineers is a good example.  
 
A broad scope of different jobs will therefore fall under the definition “same 
enterprise” hence, there is within reach of the current legislation, potential to 
address a significant portion of the gender wage gap.     
 
 3.6. Burden of proof 
3.6.1. EU law 
 
According to article 19 of directive 2006/54/EC it is for the respondent 
(employer) to prove that the equal pay principle has not been breached where 
facts, from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect 
discrimination, have been established. The burden of proof thus shifts to the 
                                                
76 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.28 
77 ibid. p.105 
78 In Norway referred to as forvaltningsorganer 
79 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.105 
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employer in pay discrimination cases so as to not make it too difficult for a 
victim of discrimination to make a case. The view has emerged from the 
European Court of Justice that if the normal division of proof were applied in 
cases where the employer does not have an easily accessible and 
understandable pay system, it would be excessively difficult or impossible to 
prove that pay discrimination has taken place.80  
 
3.6.2. Domestic law 
  
In correspondence to these obligations The Gender Equality Act establishes that 
if circumstances give rise to the belief that discrimination has taken place, it is 
for the employer to substantiate that discrimination has not taken place.81 
 
3.7. Direct and Indirect discrimination   
 
3.7.1. International labour law and EU law 
 
Discrimination based on sex must be established for the principle of equal pay 
for work of equal value to be breached. The principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination according to both 
international labour standards and EU law. The pay practice does not need to be 
intentionally discriminatory, i.e. that the wage difference is attributed to sex, in 
order to be contrary to the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. If the 
wage difference has a discriminatory effect, i.e. is in fact discriminatory, it can 
be considered indirectly discriminatory and contrary to the principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value.82 Art 2(1)(b) of directive 2006/54/EC defines 
indirect discrimination as: 
 
“where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put 
persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the 
other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a 
                                                
80 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (3rd edn, OUP 2011) 
p.851 
81 Likestillingsloven 2013, §27: ”Det skal legges til grunn at diskriminering har funnet sted 
hvis: a) det foreligger omstendigheter som gir grunn til å tro at det har skjedd diskriminering og 
b) den ansvarlige ikke sannsynliggjør at diskriminering likevel ikke har funnet sted” (original 
text from legislation) 
82 Directive 2006/54/EC art 2(1) 
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legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary.”83 (emphasis added)  
 
The question of indirect discrimination arose under EU law in the case of 
Bilka,84 where a department store company excluded part-time workers from its 
occupational pension scheme. The exclusion was gender-neutral in that it 
applied to both male and female part-timers. However, among the employees of 
the company 75% of the women were part-timers, but only 10% of the men. 
There was no intention to discriminate; yet the effect of the measure was in fact 
discriminatory and would be contrary to the principle of equal pay unless 
objective justification could be provided. 
 
The situation could be the same if a female cleaner performing work of equal 
value to a male janitor, received less pay. There might be no intention to 
discriminate and both female and male cleaners and female and male janitors 
receive the set wages. However, the pay can still be considered indirectly 
discriminatory if the cleaners employed are predominantly women and the 
janitors employed are predominantly men.  
 
Scrutinizing the wage difference between a female dominated profession and a 
male dominated profession can unveil pay discrimination that is indirect. This 
is an element of the law on equal pay for work of equal value, which is essential 
for addressing the gender wage gap in a horizontally gender segregated labour 
market.  
 
3.7.2. Domestic law  
 
Both direct and indirect discrimination are contrary to the principle of equal pay 
under the Gender Equality Act. This is rooted in the Act’s general 
discrimination clause,85 which prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination 
and provides a definition of those concepts congruent with article 2(1) of 
directive 2006/54/EC.  
 
§5(1) frames unequal treatment based on pregnancy and childbirth as directly 
discriminatory. This places emphasis on the importance of eradicating this form 
of discrimination, which is so inextricably linked to gender.  
 
In Norway, detecting and correcting indirect discrimination is essential to 
addressing the gender wage gap. This is because discriminatory pay practices, 
which follow a gender segregated labour market will not be direct and openly 
                                                
83 Directive 2006/54/EC 2(1)(b)(emphasis added) 
84 Case C-170/84 Bilka (1986) 
85 Likestillingsloven 2013, §5(1) 
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attributed to sex, rather they will be based on reasons which are apparently 
gender neutral but which in fact put women in a disadvantaged position. This 
type of discrimination can be harder to detect and correct. For example when 
entire professions are paid relatively low wages, both men and women in that 
profession are affected. You cannot point to one woman being treated less 
favourably than a man. One must look at the gender composition of that 
profession and the status of that profession within the labour market in order to 
be able to detect indirect discrimination embedded in the structure of the labour 
market.   
 
3.8. Objective justifications for different pay 
 
3.8.1. International labour law and EU law  
 
The final factor in the evaluation of pay discrimination is objective 
justifications. The right to equal pay is not absolute. There can be certain 
objective reasons, which justify a wage difference despite the fact that it has a 
discriminatory effect on women. Using the Bilka case mentioned above as an 
example; even though women were disproportionately negatively affected by 
the measure that excluded part-timers from benefits, it would still not be 
considered discriminatory and contrary to the principle of equal pay if the 
employer had an objective reason, which justified the difference in treatment 
between part-time workers and full-time workers. EU law provides guidance on 
the use of objective justifications for different pay.  
 
Although the European Court of Justice has accepted such objective 
justifications, it is less clear where international labour standards stand on this 
issue. The Committee of Experts, although clearly conceding that there may be 
objective differences in the value of jobs based purely on their content, they 
have stated that “ “Value” in the context of the convention indicates that 
something other than market forces should be used to ensure the application of 
the principle, as market forces may be inherently gender-biased.”86 For 
example, external factors that arguably justify unequal pay can have the effect 
of systematically rewarding male professions, while disadvantaging female 
professions. This statement calls into question whether reasons for different 
pay, which do not relate to the objective content of the job, but rather external 
factors, are legitimate in light of international labour standards. The overall 
                                                
86 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General 
Survey on the fundamental conventions concerning rights at work in light of the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, International Labour Converence, 101th 
Session, 2012, para. 674 
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purpose of equal pay seems not to permit this as gender equality risks being 
systematically undermined.   
 
As art 2(1)(b) of directive 2006/54/EC states, an indirectly discriminatory 
measure can be objectively justified if it pursues a legitimate aim, and 
providing the measure is appropriate and necessary for achieving that aim, i.e. 
the test of proportionality. An example of a legitimate aim may be needs caused 
by the state of the labour market, such as a shortage of candidates for a job. The 
following introduces the use of objective justifications under EU law using 
guidance from the European Court of Justice.  
 
The case of Bilka provides a starting point for the use of objective justifications. 
The European Court of Justice makes a general statement to the effect that, the 
difference in wage must correspond to a “real need on the part of the 
undertaking”, it must be “appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives 
pursued” and it must be “necessary to that end.” Examples of what criteria can 
justify higher relative pay include, a worker’s length of service, flexibility or 
adaptability to hours and places of work and the state of the employment 
market.87 
 
Note here that personal characteristics become relevant in the consideration of 
objective justifications. In the objective job evaluation stage only the job 
content can be considered, personal characteristics are kept out of the process. 
As we shall see, objective justifications can be inherently discriminatory. From 
an equal pay perspective their application warrants caution.      
 
Length of Service 
 
The length of time someone has been active in their profession can constitute an 
objective reason which justifies higher relative pay. Women have, in 
connection with family responsibilities, more interruptions to their 
employment. In this context, the length of service justification has the potential 
of systematically disadvantaging women.  
 
In the case of Cadman88 length of service was accepted as an objective 
justification because of the link between the length of an employee’s service 
and the employee’s ability to perform his or her duties better to the advantage 
of the undertaking. When it comes to this criterion, the employer is not required 
to account for this link in detail. It is presumed that the longer an employee has 
been in service the better equipped they are to perform their duties.  
 
This shows that a “real need” does not require that the undertaking be in a 
situation of desperation or absolute necessity, a legitimate aim can simply be 
                                                
87 Case C-127/92 Enderby (1993) paras. 25-26 
88 Case C-17/05 Cadman (2006) 
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that it is in the economic interest of the company, providing of course that the 
relative higher wage is proportional in pursuit of that interest.  
 
Personal characteristics tied with the performance of work 
 
Personal characteristics, which are tied to the performance of work, can justify 
higher relative pay. This is because the performance by an employee of their 
work is necessarily tied to the needs and interests of the undertaking he or she 
works for. As we recall, personal characteristics cannot feature in the objective 
evaluation of jobs. Gender stereotyping can express itself under the guise of 
seemingly neutral rewarding of certain personal characteristics. Yet, it is 
possible for the employer to objectively justify the rewarding of higher wages 
to an employer based on their personal characteristics. This therefore seems 
somewhat contradictory to the principle of equal pay but it is important to note 
that there are restrictions to the use of this justification.  
 
Unlike with length of service, the link between a personal characteristic and the 
performance of the work, is not simply presumed. The employer will be 
required to account for this. As follows from the case of Danfoss89 the personal 
characteristic rewarded with pay supplements must be connected to the 
performance of the specific tasks entrusted to the employee in question. The 
case concerned pay supplements in reward of mobility (the same applies to pay 
supplements in reward of training). The Court held that:  
 
“the employer may justify recourse to the criterion of mobility if it is 
understood as referring to adaptability to variable hours and varying places of 
work, by showing that such adaptability is of importance for the performance of 
the specific tasks which are entrusted to the employee.”90 
 
For example, if a civil servant has undergone extra financial training this can 
only be rewarded with a pay supplement if the civil servant in question is 
entrusted with tasks relevant to that training, e.g. responsibility for budget.91 
 
In the case of Brunnhofer92 it was held that the productivity of an employee can 
justify pay supplements. The European Court of Justice stated that it was 
essential for the employer to be able to take employee’s productivity into 
account and therefore their individual work capacity when rewarding pay.93 
This must however, be based on the actual output of the employee once having 
already taken up employment. A pay supplement cannot be given on the 
                                                
89 Case C-109/88 Danfoss (1989) 
90 ibid. para 25(i) 
91 Lina Berg Valnes, Retten til lik lønn for arbeid av lik verdi- målsetninger og resultater (LLM 
thesis, University of Tromsø 2009) p.34  
92 Case C-381/99 Brunnhofer (2001) 
93 Ibid. para 72 
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expectation that said person will be more productive. Otherwise, gender-bias 
could very easily enter into the process. 
 
Market value:  
 
The Enderby case held that the state of the employment market, which may 
lead an employer to increase the pay of a particular job in order to attract 
candidates, can constitute an objectively justifiable ground for unequal pay.94 
 
This justification is of particular relevance to the concentration of women in 
low-paid professions and will form the subject of further study in the next 
chapter. An example where the market value justification can work to the 
particular disadvantage of women is a monopsony in relation to a female 
dominated profession. An illustrative example is the demand for both primary 
school teachers and engineers in Norway’s public sector. Engineers, a male 
dominated profession, are more exposed to competition from various employers 
in both public and private sector and are thus able to use the market to drive up 
wages. Primary school teachers, a female dominated profession, are employed 
almost exclusively by local government in a primarily public education system 
and cannot threaten to seek employment elsewhere. They can therefore not use 
the market to drive their wages up.  
 
The Enderby case concerned a speech therapist (a female dominated profession) 
that received considerably lower pay than pharmacists (a male dominated 
profession). The employer was the National Health Service, which justified the 
wage difference based on market value.  
 
The European Court of Justice started out by stating that the way in which the 
market value justification is to be applied in the circumstances of each case will 
depend on the individual facts.95 The Court suggested that if the employer is 
able to show “precisely what proportion of the increase in pay is attributable to 
market forces”96 it must be accepted that the measure is objectively justified to 
the extent of that proportion. The Court goes on to state that if this is not 
shown, it is for the national court to assess whether the role of market forces in 
determining the rate of pay was sufficiently significant to provide objective 
justification for part or all of the difference.97    
 
It appears that quite a high threshold for accepting market value is intended 
here. The actual situation of the labour market must be accounted for and 
provide the basis for the difference in market value. The employer must thus 
                                                
94 Case C-127/92 Enderby (1993) 
95 ibid. para 25 
96 ibid. para 27 
97 ibid. para 28 
 
36 
show that the situation of the labour market makes it necessary to increase the 
pay of one group to the extent in question in order to attract job candidates.  
 
3.8.2. Domestic law 
 
Norwegian domestic law also allows for limited exceptions to the general 
prohibition on discrimination. As in European law, there will not be 
discrimination where there are objective justifications for differential treatment. 
According to article 6 of the gender equality act, a measure will not be 
considered discriminatory when: 
 
a) it has an objective purpose,  
b) when it is necessary to achieve that purpose and  
c) when there is a relationship of proportionality between what is sought 
to be achieved and how intrusive the measure is for the person or persons 
negatively  
affected by it. (own translation)  
 
In the Gender Equality Act’s preparatory works length of service, performance 
of work and market value were advanced as possible justifications for unequal 
pay.98 Objective justifications under Norwegian domestic law will be further 
explored in the next chapter, which assesses the case law of the complaint’s 
mechanism of the Gender Equality Act. In particular, we take a closer look at 
the market value justification.    
 
3.9. Concluding remarks 
 
The principle of equal pay for work of equal value is not only about 
establishing the objective value of jobs and evening out the differences in pay 
accordingly, i.e. Objective job evaluation is not the only requirement of the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value. The principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value is about eliminating pay practices, which are 
discriminatory on the basis of sex. A difference in pay will thus be contrary to 
the principle of equal pay when the pay difference concerns jobs that are the 
same or of equal value based on objective job evaluation and discrimination on 
grounds of sex can be established. In establishing this, steps that must be taken 
include the objective evaluation of jobs, consideration of whether the jobs fall 
within the reach of comparison of the equal pay principle, the evaluation of 
                                                
98 Ot. Prp. Nr.33(1974-1975) pkt. 4, p.58 
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direct and indirect discrimination and assessing the validity of objective 
justification for unequal pay.  
 
The ambition of the equal pay principle goes beyond addressing discrimination 
that is blatant, e.g. a woman being paid less than a man when they have the 
same job in the same company. The reach of comparison includes jobs that are 
completely different in content and reaches across professions and occupational 
borders, even between different collective bargaining agreements. The principle 
prohibits not only direct discrimination but also indirect discrimination. The 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value requires states to question and 
take action against wage differences that result from structures, traditions and 
attitudes that are inherently discriminatory and embedded in the labour market. 
This requires broad consideration of a country’s institutional structures and at 
times it will require radical changes directed at these structures. As shown 
throughout this chapter, these are essential characteristics of the law on equal 
pay for work of equal value in relation to addressing the gender wage gap in 
Norway, which follows horizontal gender segregation in the labour market. In 
certain circumstances the concentration of women in low paid professions and 
industries will be contrary to these legal rules. The principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value is as such highly relevant to the gender wage gap in 
Norway.99  
 
With this said the principle of equal pay for work of equal value is not 
unlimited and objective justifications can at times justify unequal pay even 
when women are more negatively affected. This is not intended to be a free 
pass, but rather to be interpreted narrowly. If its use is not contained it risks 
seriously undermining the equal pay principle and justifying a large portion of 
wage differences between women and men in Norway, as objective 
justifications can be inherently discriminatory.   
 
In the following chapter we take a closer look at how the domestic law on equal 
pay has been interpreted and applied with particular focus on market value 
justifications. The Equality and anti-discrimination Tribunal have been the 
central actors in developing legal practice in relation to equal pay at the national 
level.  
                                                
99 It must, however, be acknowledged that there is a notable limitation to comparisons between 
jobs within the same enterprise in the domestic legislation.  
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4 The Equality and anti-
discrimination Ombud and the 
Equality and anti-discrimination 
Tribunal 
 
4.1. Introductory remarks 
 
The norm for the equal pay for work of equal value principle derived from 
international labour standards and EU law was laid out in the previous chapter. Despite 
some limitations that were discussed, notably the “same enterprise” restriction, 
domestic legislation is largely congruent with this norm. However, the law is a living 
thing. It comes to life through the meaning given to it through application and 
interpretation. The Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud and the Equality and anti-
discrimination Tribunal, make up the complaints mechanism for the Gender Equality 
Act. Their case law makes up the central legal practice on the right to equal pay in 
Norway. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the role of these two 
bodies and to evaluate the implementation of the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value in their practice. Special attention is paid to the evaluation of market value 
justifications.   
 
4.2. An overview of the equality and anti-
discrimination Ombud and Tribunal 
 
The Gender Equality Act is enforced by the Equality and anti-discrimination Ombud 
and the Equality and anti-discrimination Tribunal100 (from now on “the Ombud” and 
“the Tribunal”).101 The mandate of the Ombud and Tribunal is given through a statute, 
Diskrimineringsombudsloven.102 In short, the Ombud and Tribunal both enforce the 
law in their capacity as a complaints mechanism. The Ombud has additional advocacy 
                                                
100 Likestillingsloven 2013, §26 
101 In Norway these bodies are referred to as Likestillingsombudet and Likestillingsnemnda 
respectively 
102 Diskrimineringsombudsloven 2006 
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responsibilities, mainly in the form of providing guidance and information on the 
subject of equality and non-discrimination.103  
 
The Ombud and Tribunal are two separate bodies. The Ombud interprets and applies 
the law in relation to specific actions and makes statements about the legality of said 
actions. Anyone can, without cost, bring a case to the Ombud or the Ombud can take 
up a case on its own initiative. The Ombud then makes a non-legally binding statement 
as to whether the action in question is in breach of the law. The intention is for the 
parties to the inquiry to voluntarily resolve their dispute in line with the statement and 
guidance provided by the Ombud.104 It is as such the first instance complaints body.   
 
If this does not happen or there is disagreement regarding the Ombud’s statement, the 
case can be brought to the Tribunal for a legally binding decision.105 The Tribunal then 
acts as an appeals body. The Tribunal is technically a state agency, but it is 
independent with its authority stipulated in formal legislation. Its role is to apply the 
law and develop legal practice.106 Furthermore, the Tribunal can order rectification, 
termination or other measures to secure discontinuation of the discrimination.107 It can 
further order fines to be issued in order to enforce compliance.108 Although the regular 
courts have jurisdiction to try the Tribunal’s decisions, decisions by the Tribunal are 
very rarely appealed to the courts. Their decisions therefore usually stand as an 
indication of current legal practice.109 
 
The decisions of the Ombud and Tribunal only have a direct effect on the individuals 
who are parties to the case at hand. When the Tribunal makes a binding decision, this 
will only be applicable to the employer and worker(s) who are parties to the case at 
hand and does not have the power to render a whole collective agreement null and 
void. Only the Labour Court has authority to try the provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement for compliance with the law110 and only the parties to a 
collective agreement can bring a case before the Labour Court.111 The Labour Court 
has not been actively used to resolve pay equality disputes in relation to collective 
bargaining agreements. It has not heard a case on this question since the “bioengineers 
case” of 1990.112 There is thus little guidance to be derived from that source on the law 
on equal pay. However, the Equality and anti-discrimination Tribunal has been granted 
the power to give reasoned statements regarding the legality of a collective bargaining 
agreement in relation to the gender equality act when an individual case gives rise to 
this issue.113 Such statements can in theory be taken up as arguments by parties in 
negotiations between workers and employers. Notably, according to the Equal Pay 
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107 Diskrimineringsombudsloven 2006, §7 
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Commission’s Gender and Pay report, the Tribunal has not made use of this power 
since it was granted in 2002.114 
 
In general we must thus rely on the statements and decisions the Ombud and Tribunal 
have made in regard to the individual circumstances of each case for guidance on the 
interpretation and application of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. 
This can of course provide guidance on questions of whether a collective bargaining 
agreement as a whole is in compliance with the principle.  
 
 
4.3. An evaluation of the practice of the Ombud 
and Tribunal  
 
4.3.1. Case sample and overview 
 
In the following, equal pay cases handled by the Ombud and Tribunal have been 
examined. The sample of cases that has been considered is equal pay cases handled by 
the Ombud and Tribunal between 2006 until present. The last time significant changes 
were made to the Gender Equality Act, all of which have been taken into account in 
Chapter Three, was in 2002. Since then the understanding of the equal pay principle 
has been in development and the case sample selected is considered sufficient to 
illustrate the current state of the law. A review of all the 47 cases of my sample (13 of 
which were appealed to the Tribunal) has been undertaken and a few, particularly 
illustrative examples have been selected for closer examination.  
 
This section is split into two parts. The first part comprises an assessment of the way in 
which the Ombud and Tribunal use objective job evaluation to evaluate whether 
different work is of equal value. The second part focuses on how the Ombud and 
Tribunal have treated objective justifications of unequal pay, specifically justifications 
based on market value. There is a reason why market value has been chosen as a focus 
point in this section. In Norway market value is the most frequently invoked 
justification for unequal pay between men and women who are performing work of 
equal value, by employers.115 At the same time the market value factor is a very 
significant contributor in perpetuating the current differences between female and male 
dominated jobs. The market value of a job usually applies not just to an individual but 
to entire professions. It is often the case that female dominated professions have a 
lower market value compared with male dominated professions. Market value, if 
allowed to dominate, risks systematically undermining many female dominated 
professions.  
 
                                                
114 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.198 
115 Lina Berg Valnes, ”Retten til lik lønn for arbeid av lik verdi- målsetningen og resultater” 
(LLM thesis, University of Tromsø 2009) p.36 
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The practice of the Ombud and Tribunal are commented on collectively despite the fact 
that they are separate bodies with separate functions. This is because their practice is 
congruent in many respects and similar language and opinions appear in both the 
Ombud and Tribunal’s statements. Where their practice diverges, this is made clear in 
the text.  
4.3.2. Work of equal value and objective job evaluation 
 
Both the Ombud and Tribunal perform the exercise of objective job evaluation to 
determine whether the work they are comparing is of equal value. It is used as a point 
of departure in the evaluation of whether the right to equal pay for work of equal value 
has been breached. If the jobs are not objectively considered to be of equal value, the 
equal pay principle is not engaged and unequal pay is permitted. If the work is 
considered to be of equal value they go on to consider whether the unequal pay is 
directly or indirectly discriminatory and further if unequal pay can still be objectively 
justified, i.e. whether the equal pay principle has been violated.  
 
As we recall from the domestic legislation, the Ombud and Tribunal are restricted to 
comparing jobs within the same enterprise, but not necessarily within the same trade or 
collective bargaining agreement. There is a broad understanding of what constitutes 
“the same enterprise”. The state is considered one employer, as is each individual 
municipality (local government) in the public sector. In the private sector it is more 
restrictive, as there are many employers that are considered completely separate. 
However, especially in the public sector, this broad understanding of “the same 
enterprise” has allowed the Ombud and Tribunal to evaluate the relative value of 
widely different jobs.   
 
As we recall from the legislation, it is the job content, which is evaluated at this stage 
and not the personal characteristics of the employee. The equal pay provision of the 
Gender Equality Act lays out a non-exhaustive list of criteria to be considered in the 
evaluation; “expertise necessary for the performance of the work, effort, responsibility 
and working conditions.”(Author’s translation)116 In their evaluation the Ombud and 
Tribunal go through each criteria separately using information provided by the 
employer, the employees, job descriptions and job advertisements to make their 
evaluation. Using this criteria both bodies have applied a liberal understanding of what 
constitutes work of equal value in the sense that even work, which is very different in 
character has been considered to be of equal value. A clear effort to eliminate gender-
bias in the process of objective job evaluation is evident.  
 
In the Aftenposten case,117 a female consultant working for a newspaper was paid less 
than a male typographer working for the same newspaper. At first glance these two 
jobs appear very different. The jobs required completely different type of expertise; the 
formal requirement for typographers was vocational training or certificate in graphics 
and for the consultant it was, in more general terms, relevant education, preferably 
                                                
116 Likestillingsloven 2013, §21(3), ”…den kompetanse som er nødvendig for å utføre arbeidet 
og andre relevante faktorer, som for eksempel anstrengelse, ansvar og arbeidsforhold.” (original 
text from legislation) 
117 case LDO 06/15 Aftenposten (Ombud) and case LDN 17/2006 (Tribunal) 
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within sales and marketing. Yet both the Ombud and Tribunal arrived at the conclusion 
that the expertise required was of equivalent level and thus of equal value.  
 
In comparing the effort, responsibility and working conditions required, the Tribunal 
stressed that comparison can, according to the law, take place between completely 
different trades and professions. The employees do not need to be performing the same 
tasks; the question is whether they are performing work, which is of equal value. Even 
though the work tasks in this case were very different, the Tribunal pointed out that 
both the typographer and consultant job related to the production of advertisements. 
The consultants’ focus was on the sale of advertisements and the typographers’ focus 
was on their technical production. The Tribunal made an interesting comparison 
between the jobs in relation to effort and working conditions. It pulls out the jobs’ 
relationship with deadlines as a point of commonality. Although the typographer’s 
deadlines were more absolute in that an advertisement could not be printed in time if 
was is not completed, the sales consultants were under general time pressure to secure 
sufficient numbers of adds by the printing date. The Ombud and Tribunal examine jobs 
at a detailed level and are creative in their evaluative technique.  
 
In the Harstad case118 both the Ombud and Tribunal demonstrated their willingness to 
challenge traditional conceptions on the value of typically female jobs. In this case two 
female nurses were considered to be performing work of equal value compared to four 
engineers employed by Harstad municipality. The Ombud made a statement to the 
effect that: 
 
Although comparison between jobs that are of very different character raises 
challenges, it would be contrary to the purpose of the principle of equal pay if 
such differences prevented the evaluation of whether two people, or two 
professions, are performing work of equal value. (Authors translation).119  
 
The Ombud captured the intention of objective job evaluation, which is not just to 
compare jobs that are the same or similar, but to undertake comparison between jobs 
that are widely different. It is meant to go beyond and challenge preconceived attitudes 
about the relative value of different work.   
 
In coming to the conclusion that the nurses and engineers were performing work of 
equal value, both the Ombud and the Tribunal, as in the Aftenposten case, went 
through each objective criteria separately. They considered the actual tasks the 
employees were entrusted to perform on a day-to-day basis and made an evaluation 
accordingly. An important point was made by both bodies in regard to the 
responsibility of the nurses and engineers. Mistakes made by the engineers could have 
economic consequences for and cause technical problems in the municipality, while 
the nurses’ actions have consequences for the life and health of the inhabitants of the 
                                                
118 case LDO 06/1834 Harstad (Ombud) and case LDN 23/2008 (Tribunal) 
119 case LDO 06/1834 Harstad (Ombud): ”Ombudet ser at sammenlinkningen mellom arbeidet 
som sykepleierne ytfører, og arbeidet som ingeniørene utfører, byr på utfordringer. Ombudet vil 
allikevel bemerke at karakteren av forskjellige typer arbeid ikke skal være et hinder for å 
vurdere om to personer, eller to yrkeskategorier, utfører arbeid av like verdi. Dersom en slik 
synsvinkel skulle være lagt til grunn, ville mye av formålet med forbudet mot ulik lønn for 
arbeid av like verdi falle bort.” (original text from case) 
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municipality. It was emphasised that responsibility for humans carries the same weight 
as responsibility for material value.120  
 
The Ombud and Tribunal have stressed this point on several occasions. In the SFO-
case,121 responsibility for students was considered to be of equal value as responsibility 
for the coordination of technical operations. In another case three female managers in 
the care sector were considered to be performing work of equal value to a male 
manager of industries. In finding that responsibility for people was of equal value to 
responsibility for material value, the Ombud and Tribunal emphasised one of the main 
purposes of objective job evaluation, which is to challenge our perception of the value 
of traditionally female work.122  
 
Based on these examples, both the Ombud and Tribunal demonstrate that they are 
capable of evaluating the content of jobs in an objective and rigorous manner. 
Thinking outside the box of what can be included in the criteria expertise, effort, 
responsibility and working conditions, allows work to be considered comparable even 
when the employees are performing very different tasks. Interestingly, the Ombud and 
Tribunal, with reference to the overall purpose of the equal pay principle, places 
emphasis on challenging attitudes and conceptions about the value of traditionally 
female work. This is very much in keeping with the purpose of objective job 
evaluation, the essence of which is to eliminate gender bias in the process of according 
value to different jobs. This is fundamental to addressing the gender wage gap in a 
horizontally gender segregated labour market because it opens up the possibility of 
comparing the wages of typical female work and typical male work which is often very 
different in character and challenge any presumption that less value should be accorded 
to typically female work. This is a starting point in addressing the portion of the gender 
wage gap attributed to the concentration of women in professions and industries lower 
down on the pay scale.  
 
 
4.3.3. Market value – the Tribunal’s Achilles heel? 
 
When work is found to be of equal value based on objective job evaluation, it does not 
necessarily mean that the employer has violated the principle of equal pay by awarding  
the work different wages. It does, however, create a presumption that the jobs should 
be awarded equal wages. In other words the burden of proof shifts to the employer to 
show that discrimination has still not taken place, despite the jobs being of equal 
value.123  
 
                                                
120 case LDN 23/2008 Harstad (Tribunal): ”Effektivitetshensyn tilsier derfor at ansvar for 
mennesker tillegges samme vekt som ansvar for materielle verdier.”  
121 case LDO 07/406 SFO (Ombud) and LDN 42/2009 SFO (Tribunal) 
122 case LDO 07/406 SFO (Ombud): ”Ett av formålene med likelønnsbestemmelsen er å 
oppjustere typiske kvinneyrker. Effektivitetshensyn tilsier derfor at ansvar for mennesker 
tillegges samme vekt som ansvar for materielle verdier.” (original text from case) 
123 see case LDO 07/1652 
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The Ombud and Tribunal’s liberal assessment of the comparative value of different 
jobs is somewhat contrasted by their more conservative approach in determining 
whether discrimination has taken place. The Ombud and Tribunal diverge more here in 
their practice compared to their more homogenous approach to objective job 
evaluation. In particular, it is the Tribunal’s rather generous acceptance of employers’ 
objective justifications for unequal pay that causes concern from the perspective of pay 
equality.   
 
The influence of market value on wage has its basis in the logic that wage is 
determined by different influences in the supply and demand of labour. Wages usually 
rise when there is a shortage of labour and sinks in industries that are saturated. The 
way in which this can work to the disadvantage of women is when there is a lower 
demand for female dominated trade compared to male dominated trade even though 
the work in question is of equal value.  
 
In my sample of cases I have identified 8 in which the employer’s reliance on the 
market value justification is in focus. In two of these cases the Ombud and Tribunal 
were in agreement that the market value argument could not justify unequal pay. In the 
remaining 4 cases, while the Ombud rejected the market value argument, the Tribunal 
reversed the decision, accepting market value as an objective justification for unequal 
pay. A closer look at the two following cases provides an illustration of how the 
Ombud and Tribunal have handled the invocation of the market value justification.  
 
 
The Harstad Case  
 
The Harstad case concerned whether the wage difference between female nurses and 
male engineers employed by Harstad municipality violated the equal pay principle. As 
mentioned in the previous section, both the Ombud and Tribunal agreed that the nurses 
and engineers were performing work, which was of equal value. However, the Ombud 
reached the conclusion that the wage difference was discriminatory and in breach of 
the equal pay principle while the Tribunal found the wage difference to be objectively 
justified.  
 
Harstad municipality argued that because they struggle to retain employed engineers, 
wage is used as a tool to keep the required labour. In this sense the wage difference 
between the nurses and engineers was not gender based but had its basis in the 
engineers’ labour market position. Both the Ombud and Tribunal conclude on this 
basis that no direct discrimination has taken place.  
 
It was then considered whether the wage difference was indirectly discriminatory. In 
evaluating whether the measure was indirectly discriminatory, it was observed that 
nurses are a female dominated group while engineers are a male dominated group and 
if the effect of the measure is such that women are in fact more negatively affected 
than men, it must be considered indirectly discriminatory. The Ombud stated that the 
rewarding of higher wages to engineers based on their stronger labour market position 
systematically puts women in a disadvantaged position. It emphasised here that the 
market value justification was integrated into the pay policy of the municipality 
without further consideration of its consequences for equal pay. The Ombud warned 
that if such differences were acceptable this would mean 
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perform work of equal value, the market will still automatically dictate what wage they 
receive. This would seriously undermine the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value.124 The Ombud and Tribunal thereby agreed that the wage difference was 
indirectly discriminatory.  
 
Where the Ombud and Tribunal’s opinions diverged, however was in consideration of 
whether, despite the wage difference being indirectly discriminatory it could be 
permitted with reference to objective justifications. As mentioned in Chapter Two, 
according to §6 of the Gender Equality Act, differential treatment will not be 
considered discriminatory when it has an objective purpose, is necessary to achieve 
that purpose and there is a relationship of proportionality between the purpose to be 
achieved and the intrusiveness of the measure for the person or persons negatively 
affected by it. The Ombud emphasised that according to the preparatory works of the 
Gender Equality Act this exception is to be interpreted narrowly i.e. there is a high 
threshold for fulfilling these requirements.125  
 
Neither the Ombud nor the Tribunal contested that the pay practice pursued an 
objective purpose. The Tribunal stated that in order for this requirement to be fulfilled, 
the pay practice must be based on a real need of the undertaking.126 This criteria was 
satisfied in this case, as the fulfilment of certain duties of the municipality was 
dependent on the expertise of engineers. The Ombud and Tribunal also agreed that 
giving the engineers higher wages was both a suitable and necessary measure to retain 
needed labour. The Ombud stressed in reference to the necessity requirement that the 
engineers’ labour market position is very different from that of nurses, as engineers can 
often apply for jobs in private companies if the municipality does not offer competitive 
wages. Nurses do not have the same opportunity, as there are fewer jobs for them 
within the private sector.  
 
However, the Ombud was not satisfied that there was a relationship of proportionality 
between the purpose to be achieved and the intrusiveness of the measure for the 
persons negatively affected by it. Here, the interest of the municipality must be 
balanced with the consequences for the nurses. The Ombud stated that in this exercise 
consideration for the relevant equality principle is to carry a lot of weight.127 The 
                                                
124 case LDO 06/1834 Harstad (Ombud): ”Etter ombudets oppfatning må det legges til grunn at 
dette vilkåret er oppfylt hvis lønnspolitikken eller lønnssystemet i en virksomhet systematisk 
fører til at kvinner of menn som utfører arbeid av lik verdi, lønnes ulikt. Så langt ombudet kan 
se er dette tilfellet i Harstad kommune, ettersom kommunen uten videre legger en 
markedstekning til grunn for lønnsfastsettelsen, uten noen nærmere vurdering av hvilke følger 
dette får i forhold til likelønn, eller om slike konsekvenser er akseptable.”(original text from 
case) 
125 case LDO 06/1834 Harstad (Ombud): ”det fremgår av ordlyden (”særlige tilfeller”) og er 
også forutsatt i forarbeidene at unntaksbestemmelsen skal tolkes strengt” (original text from 
case) 
126 case LDN 23/2008 Harstad (Tribunal): ”Kravet om saklighet betyr først og fremst at 
arbeidsgivers begrunnelse for lønnsforskjellene skal bygge på reelle behov.” (original tekst 
from case) 
127 case LDO 06/1834 Harstad (Ombud): ”I forholdsmessighetsvurderingen må de hensyn som 
begrunner kommunens handlemåte, vurderes i forhold til hvor inngripende konsekvenser denne 
har for kvinnene som rammes. I denne vurderingen må man legge stor vekt på de 
likestillingshensyn som gjør seg gjeldende.” (original tekst from case)  
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Ombud referred to the equal pay provision of the Gender Equality Act, which states 
that, “the right to equal pay for work of equal value applies regardless of whether the 
jobs belong to different trades and if the wage is determined by different collective 
bargaining agreements.”(Author’s translation).128 The Ombud observed that if one is to 
accept all wage differences with a basis in market value, this provision of the law 
would lose its meaning.  
 
Indeed, in Norway’s gender segregated labour market women and men are often 
concentrated in different trades and they are subject to different collective bargaining 
agreements. Due to gender segregation and historical socio-economic reasons it is 
often the case that female dominated professions have a weaker labour market position 
than male dominated professions. The Harstad case’s nurse and engineers comparison 
is a classic example of this.  
 
The Ombud referred to the preparatory works of the Gender Equality Act and 
emphasised that the purpose of the Gender Equality Act is to change “tradition, 
structures and practice” (Author’s translation)129 that are discriminatory. The situation 
between nurses and engineers is an example of exactly this type of discrimination. The 
Ombud explained that nursing has always been a female dominated profession with 
relatively low pay due to among other things that the public sector has largely had a 
monopoly on the use of their labour. Engineers, on the other hand, have always been a 
male dominated profession with relatively high pay due to, among other things, the 
existence of a competitive market outside the public sector. In order for the purpose of 
the equal pay provision to be kept alive, this form of structural discrimination cannot 
be tolerated. The Ombud thereby concluded that the proportionality requirement was 
not fulfilled and the equal pay provision of the Gender Equality Act had been breached 
by the municipality.  
 
The Tribunal’s majority was of the opinion that it would be unreasonable to deny the 
municipality the ability to use wages as a means of retaining the needed labour. It 
considered the size of the wage difference between the nurses and engineers to be 
proportional to this end. It stated that it was not the intention of the Gender Equality 
Act to be used for the general increase in wages for entire trade groups. It referred to 
the Equal Pay Commissions Gender and Pay report and remarked that the question of 
how to deal with the undervaluation of female dominated professions was under 
political consideration. It thereby concluded that the wage difference was objectively 
justified and that there had been no violation of the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value.   
 
This final remark by the Tribunal causes concern, as it appears to write off its 
responsibility as interpreter and enforcer of the Gender Equality Act in the face of 
market value considerations. One interpretation could be that the Tribunal is reluctant 
to make decisive statements, which compromises the freedom of the employer when 
market forces have an influence on wages. It leaves the question for political 
                                                
128 Likestillingsloven 2013, §21(2): ”Retten til like lønn for samme arbeid eller arbeid av like 
verdi, gjelder uavhengig av om arbeidene tilhører ulike fag eller om lønnen reguleres i ulike 
tariffavtaler.” 
129 Ot. Prp. Nr 77 (2000-2001) p.61, ”Departementet viser til at det er et formål med 
likestillingsloven å endre tradisjon, strukturer og praksis som innebærer forskjellsbehandling.” 
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consideration instead of seizing the opportunity to make an important point on 
structural discrimination embedded in the Norwegian labour market. Such a statement 
would indeed have been of important normative value and of great relevance for 
addressing the gender wage differences, which follow horizontal gender segregation.  
  
With this said, the Tribunal, by referring the question for political consideration, does 
not ignore that market value can have a discriminatory effect on women in the 
Norwegian labour market. It does not, however, want to address the issue in this case. 
Of course, the Tribunal does not have the mandate to require the wages to be raised for 
entire professions. It did however, have the opportunity to require the wages to be 
raised for the two individuals to this case and thereby make an important statement 
regarding the undervaluation of female dominated groups in general. It did not seize 
this opportunity.  
 
On the other hand, the Ombud does seize the opportunity. It even admits that the 
statement it is making is a radical one as it calls into question the legality of wage 
differences, which exist between many professions in the Norwegian labour market. 
What the Ombud has essentially said is that when the market suppresses women from 
receiving equal pay when they are performing work of equal value to men, the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value and gender equality more generally is 
undermined.  
 
The Ombud’s approach appears to go even further than the requirements under EU law 
in relation to the market value justification. The Ombud is pursuing an ambitious path 
in relation to equal pay. In this case the municipality was able to show that the labour 
market situation made it necessary to increase wages to retain needed labour, yet the 
Ombud was not prepared to accept the labour market justification. Rather, it chose to 
make a point about the overall purpose of the equal pay principle, which stands 
contrary to allowing the market value justification to override pay equality.     
 
If the logic of the Ombud’s statement was to be followed, this would in some cases 
mean lifting the wages of entire professions or trade groups. This is undoubtedly 
radical, not just in a normative sense but the task would be, from a logistic and 
economic perspective, a huge one.  
 
 
The SFO Case  
 
The SFO case130 also concerned the question of the legality of the wage difference 
between a female dominated profession and a male dominated profession. However, 
both the Ombud and Tribunal were in agreement in this case that the wage difference 
was discriminatory and contrary to the principle of equal pay.  
 
The case concerned the wage difference between a female after-school activities 
manager (SFO-manager)131and five male supervisors at the technical department of 
Fredrikstad municipality. As mentioned in the previous section, the work of the SFO-
                                                
130 case LDO 07/406 SFO (Ombud) and LDN 42/2009 SFO (Tribunal) 
131 SFO is an organised after-school programme, which invites youth to participate outside the 
ordinary school day. It is very common in Norway and most schools offer this service.  
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manager was considered to be of equal value to that of the male supervisors based on 
objective job evaluation.  
 
Fredrikstad municipality argued that the reason for the wage difference was the labour 
market situation, which was such that it was difficult to get a hold of the required 
labour. The wage difference was thus not attributed to sex but rather to external 
factors. Both the Ombud and Tribunal agreed that women were disproportionately 
negatively affected by the measure due to the gender composition of the two 
professions being compared. The case thus raised the question of indirect, not direct 
discrimination.  
 
The question then fell to whether market value could be used as an objective 
justification for unequal pay. Neither the Ombud nor the Tribunal accepted the market 
value justification in this case. As mentioned above the basic criteria for objective 
justification is that the measure must have an objective purpose, be necessary to 
achieve that purpose and there must be a relationship of proportionality between the 
purpose to be achieved and the intrusiveness of the measure for the person or persons 
affected by it. The Ombud referred to a statement made about market value in the 
preparatory works of the Gender Equality Act: 
 
Market value can be a reason to pay workers differently. The decisive factor 
must be to what degree there is a lack of applications (for a job), and if it is 
necessary to use wage as a tool. This means that the market value argument must 
be evaluated in light of the concrete circumstances of the labour market, and if it 
is necessary to recruit labour in this way, or if the need could be met using 
different means. (Author’s translation)132 
 
This is largely reflective of EU law guidance on market value justifications. The 
Ombud and Tribunal agreed that the municipality had only put forward an assertion 
that it was difficult to get a hold of the needed labour. No documentation was provided 
in support of this. Therefore the criteria for objective justifications had not been 
fulfilled.  
 
At first glance, this appears to be a victory for the equal pay principle as the market 
value justification was not accepted. However, on a closer look there appears to be less 
cause for enthusiasm. Both the Ombud and Tribunal chose here to focus on the fact 
that there was no documentation to support the market value justification. Neither body 
chose to make any wider statement regarding the relationship between the forces of the 
labour market and gender equality. The systematic discrimination of a female 
dominated profession as a result of the market value justification was not discussed. 
                                                
132 Ot. Prp. Nr.77 (2000-2001) p.61, ”Markedsverdi kan [...] være en grunn til å lønne 
arbeidstakere forskjellig.Det avgjørende må være i hvilket omfang det er mangel på søkere, og 
om det er nødvendig å bruke lønn som virkemiddel. Dette må bety at begrunnelsen skal 
vurderes i lys av de konkrete forhold på arbeidsmarkedet, og om det er nødvendig å etterspørre 
arbeidskraft på denne måten, eller om behovet kunne vært dekket på andre måter.” (original 
text) 
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The case suggests that had the municipality been able to document the difficulty of 
recruiting the needed labour, the market value argument would have been accepted 
without any further discussion of the consequences this would have for gender 
equality. Especially for the Ombud who ventured such a liberal application of the equal 
pay principle in the Harstad case, this judgment appears slightly meek and 
conservative in comparison.  
 
As the Ombud and Tribunal focus on very different arguments in the Harstad case and 
the SFO case, one cannot really say that one overrules the other. Perhaps, the Ombud 
chose not to delve into another normative discussion in the SFO case because the lack 
of documentation was enough to show that the proportionality requirement was not 
fulfilled, thus such a discussion was not necessary to reach the desired outcome. In 
light of this the Ombud’s normative statements in the Harstad case can still be 
considered a representation of the Ombud’s stance on pay equality and market value. 
The Tribunal on the other hand, has not demonstrated any willingness to adopt a 
position on the consequences on pay equality when forces of the labour market dictate 
wage. This leaves the state of the law on this issue somewhat ambiguous.  
 
4.4. Concluding remarks 
 
The Ombud and Tribunal have developed an impressively detailed and rigorous 
method of objective job evaluation, which allows comparison between jobs that are 
widely different in character. Many jobs that are different are thus still found to be of 
equal value. The purpose of objective job evaluation, which is to determine the relative 
value of jobs based on objective criteria free from gender bias, is upheld by the Ombud 
and Tribunal. This is of fundamental importance when it comes to wage differences, 
which follow a horizontally gender-segregated labour market, as women and men work 
in professions that are completely different.  
 
However, the way in which the market value justification has been handled presents a 
more inconclusive picture. Neither the practice of the Ombud or the Tribunal causes 
any concrete or direct conflict with the equal pay principle, however the overall 
purpose of the equal pay principle gets lost in the practice of the Tribunal. EU law 
permits objective justifications for unequal pay based on market value, but objective 
justifications are intended to be of exceptional use, not systematically justify indirectly 
discriminatory wage differences, and allowed to persist because they are embedded in 
the structure of the labour market. As we recall, the purpose of the equal pay principle 
goes beyond addressing discrimination that is blatant. It is asking states to question and 
take action against structures, tradition and attitudes that are inherently discriminatory 
and embedded in the labour market. This requires broad consideration of a country’s 
institutional structures and at times it will require radical changes directed at these 
structures. Indeed, addressing the gender wage gap, which follows horizontal gender 
segregation in the labour market is dependent on such an understanding of the equal 
pay principle. The Ombud, in the Harstad case, demonstrated that it is willing to do 
just this. However, the inconsistency between the practice of the Ombud and Tribunal 
shows that there is a lack of unity in the implementation of the equal pay principle 
between these bodies leaving the state of the law somewhat uncertain in this area.    
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5 Collective Bargaining and Wage 
Determination  
5.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Employer organisations and trade unions exercise the most influence on the 
determination of wages through collective negotiations and collective 
agreements. Although the freedom of workers and employers to negotiate their 
own collective bargaining agreements is a central principle in Norwegian labour 
law, the social partners are bound by the Gender Equality Act, hence by the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value. It is therefore interesting to 
examine the role of the social partners in an equal pay perspective. This chapter 
outlines the Norwegian collective bargaining model and discusses the role of 
the social partners in an equal pay perspective. It especially explores how equal 
pay objectives are incorporated into the activities of the social partners.  
 
5.2. An overview of collective bargaining and 
wage determination in Norway 
 
5.2.1. Organisation in the Labour market 
 
Within the labour market the influence and power of workers and employers is 
exercised through trade unions and employer organisations and expresses itself 
in the system of collective bargaining. The participation of workers and 
employers in this organisational structure is therefore crucial for its proper 
functioning. In comparison to other western countries the level of organisation 
in the labour market is relatively high in Norway. In 2013, 55% of all wage 
earners in Norway were members of a trade union. In comparison the 
organisation level was below 20% in the U.S.133 Women make up about half of 
all trade unionists in Norway. This has been the result of an increase in female 
trade union organisation over the past 30 years.134 
 
                                                
133 Statistisk Sentralbyrå (2014) Regulering av Arbeidsmarkedet – ubetinget positivt? 
<https://www.ssb.no/nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/artikler-og-publikasjoner/reguleringer-
av-arbeidsmarkedet-ubetinget-positivt> accessed 15 April 2015 
134 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn p.79 
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Workers are organised into various trade unions with a particular industry or 
trade membership profile, for example NITO, which organises over 70 000 
engineers and technologists and Norsk Sykepleierforbund, which organises 
over 100 000 nurses midwives and nursing students. These are in turn affiliated 
to one of the four central trade unions: Landsorganisasjonen (LO), Unio, 
Akademikerne and Yrkesorganisasjonens Sentralforbund (YS). The 
membership profile of the central trade unions are roughly reflective of industry 
affiliation, level of education and hence to a certain extent also sex. For 
example, LO, the largest trade union organises the majority of workers without 
higher education with a spread across the public and private sector. Unio 
organises workers with college or university education, primarily within the 
public sector. About 76% of the members are women. Not surprising, 
considering that most highly educated women are concentrated in the public 
sector.135 
 
These central trade unions have a collective bargaining relationship with five 
central employer organisations of which companies, enterprises, local 
government and central government are members: Næringslivets 
Hovedorganisasjon (NHO), Spekter, Handels- Og servicenæringens 
hovedorganisasjon (HSH), Kommunesektorens interesse- og 
arbeidsgiverorganisasjon (KS) and the Ministry of Government Administration, 
Reform and Church Affairs. The largest is NHO and its membership base is 
primarily private businesses. In the public sector KS represents the interests of 
local government (the municipalities) while the Ministry of Government 
Administration, Reform and Church Affairs represents the interests of the 
central government.136  
 
The main role of these central trade unions and employer organisations is to 
negotiate the basic collective agreements within their respective areas and 
participate in tripartite collaboration with the government. 
 
5.2.2. Collective agreements 
 
Most workers in Norway are covered by a collective agreement. Not only 
unionised workers are covered. Employers who are bound by collective 
agreements are obligated to apply the terms of the agreement to unionised as 
well as non-unionised employees. The total collective agreement coverage is 
67%. The public sector is exhaustively covered, while the private sector is 
about 50% covered.137  
 
                                                
135 NOU 2013:13 Lønnsdannelsen og utfordringer for norsk økonomi p.29-30 
136 ibid. p.32 
137 ibid. p.34 
 
53 
 
Collective agreements regulate social rights, pension and conditions of 
employment but their most central content is wage settlement. Collective 
agreements are negotiated every two years and wage negotiations take place 
every year. Wages are thus frequently subject to regulation. Apart from the 
principle of equal pay in the Gender Equality Act, there is no legislation on 
wage determination. Collective agreements are the principal source in the 
determination of wages. Hence, the social partners wield the main 
responsibility in the wage determination process. Wage negotiation is a highly 
complex process and collective agreements are concluded at different levels of 
organisation and in the various sectors of the labour market; between different 
central trade unions and employer organisations, between different trade unions 
and employer organisations at industry level or between trade unions and 
employers at company level.138 
 
There are three main types of wage determination in collective agreements. The 
main distinction is between centralised and localised regulation. Normal wage 
agreements are a centralised form of wage determination. Wages and wage 
increases139 are exhaustively determined at the central level and no money is 
allocated for additional wage increases to be determined at the local level. The 
state determines wage through normal wage agreements. Minimum wage 
agreements determine the minimum wage of different categories of workers 
and in addition, local negotiations at company level take place regarding any 
wage increases beyond this. This is the most common form of wage agreement 
in the private sector as well as in local government. Agreements without central 
regulation is when wage determination takes place exclusively at the local 
level. This is a common form of wage determination for certain groups of 
white-collar workers in the private sector.140 
 
There are notable differences in the degree of centralisation between different 
collective agreement areas. The obvious difference is between the private sector 
where there is deference to local agreements (minimum wage agreements and 
agreements without central regulation) and the public sector, which is 
characterised by centralisation. Even though minimum wage agreements are 
common in the local government sector the framework for the local wage 
increases are still negotiated at the central level. In the private sector the local 
wage increases are usually not regulated centrally, it is up to the individual 
company to determine.141 
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According to the Technical Committee for Wage Determination (we return to 
this body later) some general features of wage agreements are of particular 
significance to the way in which the gender wage gap develops. Firstly, the way 
in which central wage increases are distributed can have the effect of evening 
out wage differences between men and women. It might be given as a 
percentage increase of current wage, or as an equal sum for all workers. Special 
wage increases for low-wage workers or for particular professional groups can 
be given. Percentage increases have a neutralizing effect on wage differences, 
while equal sum increases can benefit women, as they are more concentrated in 
low-wage jobs. Special wage increases for professional groups can benefit 
women and contribute to narrowing the gender wage gap if female dominated 
professions are prioritised, as can the distribution of local wage increases if 
certain proportions of the money gets reserved for women. Thirdly, if the 
relative increases are higher in typical female sectors and industries compared 
to male dominated sectors and industries it could contribute to narrowing the 
gender wage gap.142 
 
5.2.3. Coordination and wage determination: 
frontfagsmodellen 
 
Although, as we have seen, the social partners exercise huge influence over the 
wage settlements, as there are few formal regulations on wage, the Norwegian 
wage determination model is characterised by a high degree of tripartite 
coordination. This means, in effect, that there is a framework based on certain 
solidarity principles that must be adhered to. The social partners and the 
government work closely together. The government participates through its role 
as legislator, but in the area of wage determination it exerts influence mainly 
through cooperative forums, institutions and mechanisms.  
 
Experience from Norway and other countries show that high nominal wage 
growth that is not consistent with relative productivity growth will over time 
lead to higher inflation and unemployment. A high degree of coordination in 
the Norwegian wage determination system has the intention of preserving a 
balance between market interests and workers’ interests. The model ensures 
moderate wage growth, high employment rates and small wage differences 
overall.143  
 
Frontfagsmodellen (the “frontfag” model), the logic on which the Norwegian 
system of wage determination is based, is built on the idea that wage 
development should be adapted to what the sector exposed to competition on 
the international market can handle. In this sector, if wage grows in 
                                                
142 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, box 11.2 
143 NOU 2013:13 Lønnsdannelsen og utfordringer for norsk økonomi, p.39-40 
 
55 
disproportion to what productivity permits, investment will drop and 
employment and productivity will be reduced, as it is not possible for these 
companies to increase the price of their product in response to an increase in 
expenses, as this would compromise their competitive position in the 
international market. What the frontfag model means in practice is that the 
social partners with a high composition of internationally competitive 
enterprises negotiate and form agreements first and these agreements form a 
norm for wage determination in other collective negotiations. Wage growth can 
therefore not go beyond what this sector can handle and a sufficiently large 
internationally competitive sector can thus be sustained.144    
 
  
5.3. Equal pay and collective bargaining 
 
As we have seen, the social partners play a decisive role in the income 
settlements. They are, however, bound by the Gender Equality Act’s equal pay 
principle. It is therefore interesting to explore how equal pay has been 
implemented in collective bargaining. The Norwegian collective bargaining 
system is highly complex with negotiations taking place and agreements being 
formed at different organisational levels and in different sectors of the labour 
market. Comprehensively considering all the intricacies of this system goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. The aim in this section is rather to make some 
general observations about the system of collective bargaining from an equal 
pay perspective and how equal pay is incorporated into the activities of the 
social partners.    
 
5.3.1. The social partners and the gender wage gap  
 
In consideration of how much power the social partners wield over wage 
determination a natural starting point is to explore if and how they are 
influencing the gender wage gap. Are they making any contributions to the 
widening or narrowing of the gender wage gap? 
 
The various trade unions and employer organisations represent workers and 
employers in different sectors of the labour market. In order to gage some 
understanding of how the social partners are influencing the gender wage gap it 
is necessary to separate these different collective bargaining areas in order to 
examine them in relation to one another and individually. A study entitled, The 
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Norwegian collective bargaining model in an equal pay perspective,145 
published by the Institute for Social Research does exactly this. The results of 
the study gives reason to suggest that the social partners have not made any 
great leaps in narrowing the gender wage gap. The findings of the study will be 
briefly analysed in this section. 
 
The gender wage gap and differences between collective bargaining areas 
 
As we know, the Norwegian labour market is gender segregated, as a 
consequence men and women are also concentrated in different collective 
bargaining areas. As the gender wage gap follows gender segregation in the 
labour market it would be reasonable to suspect that the fact that men and 
women are concentrated in different collective bargaining areas can explain a 
lot of the gender wage gap. However, this appears not to be the case. Nilsen and 
Schøne delimit six main collective bargaining areas in their study; central 
government, local governments, finance and insurance services, retail, industry 
officials and industry workers. In the graph below they look at how much the 
difference between these collective bargaining areas impact the gender wage 
gap. 
 
Nilsen and Schøne, diagram 5.1. p 34 
 
The upper curve represents the development of the gross gender wage gap, 
meaning the average gender wage gap between all men and women over time. 
As we see it has fluctuated between 14-15% between 1997 and 2004. The 
middle curve represents the net gender wage gap, meaning the wage gap 
between women and men with the same length of education and potential work 
experience. The fact that the net gender wage gap is smaller than the gross 
gender wage gap confirms that a part of the gender wage gap can be explained 
by differences between men and women in objective traits. It is the bottom 
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curve that is of particular interest in this section. It shows the net gender wage 
gap also controlled for collective bargaining area. This curve lies slightly below 
the net gender wage gap throughout the time period and this means that a part 
of the gender wage gap can be explained by the fact that men and women are 
concentrated in different collective bargaining areas. But only very little, in 
2004 the net gender wage gap was 9,9% and when controlled for collective 
bargaining area this was only reduced to 8,5%. This means that also within the 
collective bargaining areas a relatively large gender wage gap persists.146  
 
The gender wage gap within collective bargaining areas 
 
Hence a gap remains within each collective bargaining area. Arguably, this 
means that there is a portion of the gender wage gap that falls under the direct 
responsibility of the social partners within each collective bargaining area. 
Indeed, it is within their respective collective bargaining areas that the social 
partners exercise their influence over wage determination.  
 
The development of the gender wage gap between 1998 and 2006 within the six 
major collective bargaining areas identified by Nilsen and Schøne,147 shows 
that overall the social partners have been achieving very small reductions to the 
gender wage gap over time. However, a significant gap still persists in all areas 
leading to the conclusion that despite some slow progress, the social partners 
are essentially reproducing old wage differences imbedded in the labour 
market. This is an indication that there is potential to address the gender wage 
gap within the collective bargaining process, yet changes are not being made to 
a sufficiently large extent. Looking into ways to better address equal pay 
through collective bargaining is thus a worthwhile endeavour.  
 
It is acknowledged that the study undertaken by Nilsen and Schøne dates quite 
a few years back, yet there is reason to deduce that it is still indicative of the 
current situation. Firstly, the period studied shows a rather stable trend of near 
stagnation of the gender wage gap within collective bargaining areas. Secondly, 
in the following we look more closely at how equal pay is incorporated into the 
activities of the social partners and this information also supports the persuasion 
that major leaps have not been made by the social partners in more recent years 
to further narrow the gender wage gap.  
 
5.3.2. The social partners and equal pay  
 
Under the Gender Equality Act trade unions and employer organisations are 
under an obligation to actively, targeted and systematically work towards 
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gender equality and equal pay. Equal pay forms a formal part of collective 
bargaining agendas today, but how is equal pay actually incorporated into their 
activities? 
 
The fight for equal pay has been, to varying degrees, on the agenda of the social 
partners throughout the 20th century. The equal pay fight has evolved 
dramatically throughout history, in pace with social change and the various 
trade unions and employer organisations have developed different ideas on how 
to address the gender wage gap. The equal pay challenges the social partners 
faced in the mid 20th century, such as separate wage agreements for women and 
men were easier for the social partners to address in a unified way as these 
practices were contrary to even the core principles of equal pay enshrined in 
Convention 100.148 Since then the more indirect and structural forms of wage 
discrimination have come into focus and dissent has characterised the social 
partners policy and action in relation to equal pay. This section explores how 
equal pay is incorporated into the activities of the social partners today.  
 
Gender equality work by the social partners 
 
There is evidence that gender equality is an important part of the social 
partners’ policy agenda. Several of the organisations have incorporated 
framework agreements on gender equality within their basic collective 
agreements. For example the basic collective agreement between national 
employer organisation NHO and the national trade union LO, contains a 
supplementary agreement containing provisions on equality between men and 
women in employment.149Trade union YS and employer organisation Virke 
have the same provisions incorporated into their basic collective agreement.150 
This supplementary framework agreement on gender equality promotes equal 
opportunities and equality between men and women in regard to employment, 
wages, vocational training and career advancement. It acknowledges that all 
social partners at all levels; trade unions and employer organisations as well as 
individual companies or employers have a responsibility in this pursuit. These 
are very general obligations and the agreement does not give any more specific 
guidance on how to achieve gender equality in employment. Concerning equal 
pay, the agreement recommends that NHO and LO should develop strategies 
and mechanisms to tackle gender based wage differences. No further guidance 
is provided on what constitutes gender based wage differences or where the 
social partners are to derive guidance from on this subject. Notably the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal vale is not even mentioned.  
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In the basic collective agreement of employer organisation for local 
government, KS,151 only two brief references to equal pay are made. The 
agreement states that wage policy should promote and sustain equality between 
the sexes and it should be practiced in such a way that women and men are 
treated equally in the consideration of wage and advancement.152 The 
agreement also requires employers to annually produce gender-disaggregated 
statistics showing wage level and development in different jobs as a basis for 
discussions on pay equality.153 Again, there is no further elaboration on what it 
means that women and men are treated equally in the consideration of wage. 
There is no mention of where guidance on this question is to be derived from, 
nor is the principle of equal pay work of equal value stipulated.  
 
Employer organisations and trade unions have also undertaken gender equality 
initiatives on a more ad hoc basis. For example employer organisation, KS, has 
undertaken a project named “Gjennomslag” (Breakthrough) with the aim of 
increasing the proportion of women in municipal leadership positions. 
Employer organisation Virke, in cooperation with LO and industry level trade 
union HK, have undertaken activities looking into improving the working 
environment for pregnant employees in retail.154  
 
Trade unions have, to a greater extent than employer organisations, integrated 
gender equality as a formal part of their agenda and have institutional 
mechanisms dedicated to this. For example LO has a special gender equality 
committee that meats six times a year. Equivalent Committees are also found at 
the regional and local levels of organisation. YS have their own gender equality 
council headed by a gender equality councillor. Unio has gender equality and 
equal pay as one of its main policy areas and has developed its own political 
platform for equality. The subject of equal pay forms a central part of the 
content. A part of this equality work is also performed by the various industry 
level trade unions affiliated to Unio.155  
 
There is thus evidence of political will and a degree of formal integration of 
gender equality and equal pay goals among the social partners. The problem of 
equal pay, as we know, is not an isolated issue but associated with gender 
inequality more widely. In that sense it is positive that the social partners 
appear to take a holistic approach to gender equality and equal pay, 
acknowledging the need for social and structural changes. However, what must 
be noted is that no comprehensive or coordinated picture emerges on how the 
social partners define their gender and pay equality goals or how they work 
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towards them.  Furthermore, the legal principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value does not appear to have a strong presence in their activities.  
 
There is, however, one unifying element worth mentioning. Arbeidslivs og 
Pensjonspolitisk Råd (The Labour and Pension Policy Council) maintains 
regular dialogue between the Labour Minister and the organisational leaders of 
the national employer organisations and trade unions regarding challenges in 
the field of labour and pension policy. When biannually discussing gender 
equality issues, the minister of children, equality and social inclusion is also 
present.156 The Council cooperated on developing objectives and measures for 
the government’s Action plan for the promotion of equality and the prevention 
of ethnic discrimination.157 Although this document does not have a specific 
focus on equal pay it represents an endeavour to develop some common 
objectives and measures for the promotion of equality.  
 
Within the system of wage determination there are unifying elements that are of 
more direct relevance to equal pay.  
 
Equal pay and cooperation in the system of wage determination 
 
As discussed earlier tripartite cooperation and coordination in the Norwegian 
model of wage determination is of great importance to the maintenance of 
frontfagsmodellen (the “frontfag model), which ensures moderate wage growth, 
small wage differences and a high level of employment. But tripartite 
cooperation is also of importance to the consideration of equal pay in collective 
negotiations. Tripartite cooperation allows all the national employer 
originations and trade unions to be represented in a common forum and allows 
the government perspective to enter into the process. There are two main 
institutional mechanisms that facilitate cooperation in the wage determination 
system. The Government Liaison Committee for Wage Determination 
(Author’s translation)158 and the Technical Calculations Committee for Wage 
Determination (Author’s translation).159 The work of these forums contains 
elements that are of particular importance to the consideration of equal pay in 
wage negotiations.  
 
The Liaison Committee is an income policy organ founded in 1962. It is headed 
by the Prime Minister and all the national employer organisations and trade 
unions are represented. Furthermore, the relevant government ministries are 
participants depending on the subject of the meetings. The committee meets 
twice a year, once in the autumn to discuss the national budget and once in the 
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spring, in the lead-up to when the social partners will negotiate the annual wage 
settlements. Although gender equality is not formally a part of the meeting 
agenda, if equality issues are relevant to wage settlements, for example equal 
pay, it can be brought up during discussions.160  
 
The Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Determination, founded in 
1967, has representatives from national employer organisations and trade 
unions. Additionally, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Finance, The 
Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs as well as 
the national statistics agency are represented. Its mandate is to present the best 
possible numerical data for use in wage negotiations. The purpose is that 
disagreement regarding economic circumstances to the best possible extent can 
be avoided. It usually produces two reports a year. One before the wage 
settlement takes place containing an overview of wage and income 
development, price trends and the development of market competitions. It also 
produces statistics and facts on equal pay and the gender wage gap. The second 
report is produced after the wage settlements have taken place and are a 
summary of the wage settlements.161   
 
These forums are thus a platform from which the social partners have the 
opportunity to develop some common understanding of the causes of the gender 
wage gap and what action should be taken to close it. But it is important to note 
that the central content of the discussions that take place within these forums is 
not equal pay but rather income policy more generally, thus their role in the 
equal pay fight in collective bargaining must not be overstated.  
 
Equal pay and dissent between the social partners 
 
In the Equal Pay Commission’s Gender and Pay report, consultation with 
various employer organisations and trade unions on the equal pay problem was 
undertaken and their statements presented in an attachment. In studying their 
understanding of the equal pay problem and their views on how to address it, it 
seems that no unified picture emerges. The social partners have nuanced 
differences and at times completely divergent views on how they explain the 
gender wage gap and what steps should be prioritised in the fight for pay 
equality. Some of these differences will be explored with references to the 
employer organisations and trade unions discussed below.  
 
LO, the largest national trade union has developed a low-wage approach to 
equal pay. This means that it views the gender wage gap as primarily a problem 
concerning low-wage jobs, in turn measures should be directed at increasing the 
wage of those that are placed lowest down on the wage ladder. In support of 
this approach it argues that the gender wage gap is also present among those 
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with shorter education and it draws attention to the fact that female dominated 
low-wage jobs make up a large proportion of the gender wage gap. It also states 
that there are forces pressing wages down in the service industry that need 
attention. A low-wage approach would benefit women who work in female-
dominated jobs that have lower educational requirements.  
 
LO emphasises that a collective and coordinated wage determination system is 
essential and it states that the degree of pay equality is largest where the trade 
union has the strongest influence over the wage settlement. It therefore 
advocates a high degree of centralisation, where this is appropriate, rather than 
a decentralised local wage negotiation structure, in the interest of equal pay. It 
is a supporter of the idea that more than a proportionate share of the local wage 
increases should be allotted to women, and they propose that a framework for 
the allocation of these funds should be negotiated at a central level. It does, 
however, emphasise that any measure should not compromise the freedom of 
the social partners to collective bargaining. Thus, no government overhaul in 
the interest of equal pay is recommended. LO would like to see equal pay 
measures integrated into the current system of wage determination, which is 
characterised by tripartite cooperation but also a high degree of freedom for the 
social partners to negotiate their own terms.162  
 
The focus on low-wage is perhaps not surprising considering LO’s membership 
profile, which to a larger extent than other trade unions is lower and middle 
income workers. In contrast a low-wage approach would not make sense to 
Unio.  
 
Unio, which represents mainly college and university educated workers in the 
public sector, has adopted an equal pay approach, which focuses on the 
undervaluation of female jobs. What they mean by this is when women do not 
get the same monetary reward for their level of education compared with men. 
A focus on low-wage workers would not make sense for Unio because their 
members are not found at the bottom of the wage ladder. The main equal pay 
problem from Unio’s perspective is that highly educated women in female 
dominated professions are paid less than male counterparts in male dominated 
professions.163 
 
Unio acknowledges that the fact that the labour market is gender segregated is 
itself a problem from an equal pay perspective. Work must be done to even out 
the spread of men and women across the labour market. But although Unio 
advocates measures that encourage men and women to make less gender 
stereotypical choices about their education and career, it sees the 
undervaluation of female work as an element inextricably linked with gender 
segregation in the labour market. In other words the undervaluation of female 
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work is in itself contributing to the gender wage gap and in addition to this it is 
contributing to maintaining gender segregation in the labour market. In order to 
encourage men and women to make less gender stereotypical choices it is 
crucial that wages reflect the value of the profession. It will be exceedingly 
difficult to recruit more men into the nursing profession, for example, if 
something is not done about the wage levels.164     
 
Unio emphasises the fact that highly educated workers in the public sector earn 
considerably less than equivalently educated workers in the private sector. It 
singles out female dominated work in the public sector as a particularly 
undervalued group and argues that it is a problem with consequences for pay 
equality that education, competence and responsibility is valued at a higher rate 
in the private sector than in the public sector.165 It thus seems to advocate that 
wage differences that cut across the public-private sector divide should be 
addressed. As we recall, the legislation on equal pay does not require such a 
comparison.  
 
Unio sees the equal pay responsibility as lying with the social partners and the 
government to increase wages for female dominated profession in the public 
sector. It is of the opinion that the fight for equal pay must be conducted 
through collective bargaining but also through government action. It advocates 
an ambitious plan to lift the wages of female dominated professions in the 
public sector so that wages reflect their education and expertise, although it 
does not venture to specify exactly which professional groups they are referring 
to.166 This plan would require a much larger role for the government in wage 
determination system and as such it would require more compromise by the 
social partners on their freedom to negotiate. Unio even goes as far as stating 
that the government should take responsibility to ensure that educated female 
groups in the public sector receive equal pay to male dominated professions in 
the private sector with the same level of education.167 As expected the employer 
organisations are more conservative in their approach to equal pay than their 
trade union counterparts. This goes for the private sector employer organisation 
NHO as well as the public sector KS.  
 
NHO is the largest employer organisation with a membership profile primarily 
within industry. It views the gender wage gap as mainly a problem of gender 
segregation between the public and the private sector. However, in difference to 
Unio it does not consider that it is within its role to even out differences across 
sectors. It sees its role as primarily being to address equal pay within the NHO-
area thus within the private sector. At the same time it does not consider that it 
is within anyone’s role to interfere in the recruitment process of private 
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businesses. This means that it neither considers the problem of the 
undervaluation of female dominated work across the public-private sector 
divide nor the lack of women in management positions within the private sector 
its concern. Furthermore, it does not consider that the undervaluation of female 
dominated work occurs within the NHO area. An example of female dominated 
work, which is low paid in the NHO area is the hotel and restaurant industry. 
NHO argues that rather than undervaluation, the wages are a reflection of the 
lack of educational requirements, the low average wage and the high turnover 
characterising the industry. It simply does not seem to find that there are equal 
pay problems that are within its responsibility to address.168  
 
KS is the employer organisation for local government, i.e. the municipalities. 
As we recall it is in this sector that there is a particularly heavy concentration of 
educated women in low paid jobs, such as nurses and primary school teachers. 
KS emphasises that the gender wage gap is considerably lower in the municipal 
sector than the other sectors. The average gender wage gap is, as we recall, at 
about 14% while, according to their own sources, the gender wage gap in the 
municipal sector is at about 6%. It thereby attributes most of the gender wage 
gap to the public-private divide.169  
 
Within the municipal sector it explains the 6% gender wage gap with reference 
to firstly, that fewer women than men are found in management positions and 
secondly, that women and men are concentrated in different types of work that 
is remunerated differently. Referring to this it is of the opinion that the focus 
should be less on the wage difference between male and female work, and more 
on the question of why men and women make such different choices. Measures 
should be directed at evening out the distribution of men and women in 
positions, professions and industries in the labour market. As such it does not 
consider whether something ought to be done about wages in low-paid female 
dominated professions in the municipal sector.170  
 
As we know from some of the case law discussed in Chapter Four some female 
professions that require the same level of education and are of equal value 
based objectively on job content are not paid equal wages in the municipal 
sector. An example of this is nurses and engineers. The statement made by KS 
does not discuss whether or not something ought to be done with the 
persistence of this wage difference.  
 
What it does emphasise, however, is the importance of preserving the social 
partners’ right to free negotiations in the wage determination process and 
stresses that the municipalities must be free to take into consideration certain 
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virkemidler for likelønn (2008) Ref. 08/00820-5 520,  p.1 
170 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, vedlegg 1: Innspill fra Referansegruppen, p.264 
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market interests where this is necessary, for example to compete for needed 
labour.171 This suggests that they find that current wage differences between 
different professions in the municipal sector satisfactorily justified. In an 
official response to the recommendations proposed by the Equal Pay 
Commissions in its Gender and Pay report, KS states that the municipal sector 
is characterised by gender segregation but that women and men are either 
concentrated in different jobs that are not of the same value, or they are 
concentrated in different jobs that are of the same value yet are remunerated 
differently based on legitimate reasons.172  
 
 
5.4. Concluding remarks  
 
Although there is a portion of the gender wage gap that can be explained by the 
fact that men and women are concentrated in different collective bargaining 
areas, we have seen that even within collective bargaining areas, a portion of 
the gender wage gap persists. The social partners thus wield great responsibility 
over the future of equal pay, yet they have been making only slow progress 
towards narrowing the gender wage gap within their respective areas.  
 
Gender equality and equal pay issues are incorporated into the activities of the 
social partners in different ways and the approach varies from one organisation 
to the other. They have separate gender equality agendas with varying degrees 
of commitment and the principle of equal pay for work of equal value does not 
appear to be formally incorporated into these agendas. Despite there being 
elements of cooperation between employer organisations, trade unions and the 
government on gender equality issues, when it comes to equal pay cohesion 
seems to be lacking. There is no tripartite forum dedicated to equal pay, rather 
equal pay forms a component of the agenda when social partners meet to 
primarily discuss other things. It seems no common understanding of the equal 
pay problem or what is required to address it emerges. The principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value does not appear to feature strongly anywhere in 
their activities even though it is the only legal authority on what the obligation 
to work towards equal pay actually requires.  
 
The social partners' divergent approaches to equal pay, also reflects the 
conclusion that there is a lack of guidance and common understanding of the 
equal pay problem and what is required to address it. Of course, some of these 
differences must be considered in light of the fact that different trade unions 
and worker organisations represent workers and employers in different sectors 
                                                
171 KS høringsuttalelse vedrørende NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og lønn – Fakta, analyser og 
virkemidler for likelønn (2008) Ref. 08/00820-5 520, para. 2.2. 
172 ibid.  
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of the labour market and accordingly have different equal pay priorities. 
However, there seems to be differences between the social partners also in the 
fundamental understanding of what the principle of equal pay actually requires. 
This can be considered a significant obstruction to eliminating pay 
discrimination contrary to the principle of equal pay. For example, Unio 
considers that the concentration of women in low-paid jobs in the municipal 
sector constitutes undervaluation of female dominated work and must be 
addressed by lifting the wages of these professions. Their most important 
collective bargaining partner KS directs the “blame” on the fact that men and 
women make traditional choices about their education and career and thus end 
up in different jobs with different pay. It does not consider whether something 
ought to be done with the current wage differences between female and male-
dominated professions in this sector. If anything it considers that these 
differences are objective and legitimate based on a combination of the different 
value of the jobs or other factors such as market value. It would therefore be 
exceedingly challenging for them to come to an agreement on an equal pay 
approach and implement it in their wage settlements.  
 
As is evident from the previous chapters of this paper, there is guidance to be 
derived from the principle of equal pay for work of equal value on these 
questions. The principle of equal pay for work of equal value can help to 
provide clarity on some of these conflicting opinions, which in turn can help the 
social partners make progress towards narrowing the gender wage gap in their 
respective areas. This brings us to the final chapter of the thesis in which I 
present some general conclusions and discuss one main recommendation based 
on the findings of this research.   
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6 Conclusions and Recommendation 
6.1. Introducing the recommendation 
 
In Norway provision is made by legal enactment for the general application of 
the equal pay principle in the Gender Equality Act. Public authorities and all 
social partners are under a negative obligation not to discriminate but also 
under the positive obligation to promote equal pay within their respective areas 
of activity. The Gender Equality Act lays down the principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value, with its origins in Convention 100 in international labour 
law. Equal pay for work of equal value calls for remuneration free from 
discrimination based on sex. As we have seen there are legal rules for 
evaluating what does and does not constitute pay discrimination contrary to the 
principle of equal pay; an objective evaluation of jobs free from gender bias is a 
starting point for determining whether jobs are of equal value. Further, in 
evaluating whether pay discrimination has taken place, there are legal rules for 
the reach of comparison between jobs, the way in which direct and indirect 
discrimination are evaluated and when an employer can nonetheless justify 
unequal pay with objective reasons. 
 
The Gender Equality Act’s complaints mechanism, embodied by the Equality 
and anti-discrimination Ombud and the Equality and anti-discrimination 
Tribunal, has been responsible for developing legal practice in this area. In the 
Norwegian context it is primarily to this authority we must look in order to 
understand what the principle of equal pay for work of equal value actually 
requires.  
 
It was concluded in the previous chapter that the social partners are not lacking 
a willingness to address gender equality and equal pay issues, but rather that 
there is a lack of cohesion in these efforts and more specifically that the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value does not have a strong presence 
in the collective bargaining process. Arguably, this is contributing to the level 
of divide and confusion between the social partners concerning what action is 
actually required in order to move forward in the equal pay fight. The 
recommendation proposed in this chapter is based on the argument that 
instilling a better understanding of the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value among the social partners could engender a more unified approach to in 
the equal pay fight, which in turn would contribute to making advancements 
towards closing the gender wage gap.  
 
The Equal Pay Commission’s Gender and Pay report is a comprehensive study 
on the equal pay problem in Norway. The report also considered some 
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measures to reduce pay differences. This thesis has intended to be an expansion 
of the information provided in the report and as such the recommendation 
presented in this section purports to be an addition to those already forwarded 
by the Equal Pay Commission or other bodies. The recommendation must 
therefore be placed in the context of existing recommendations to narrow the 
gender wage gap in Norway.  
 
This thesis recommends an advisory role for the Equality and anti-
discrimination Ombud on the principle of equal pay, to provide expert advice 
that could be used by the social partners within the system of collective 
bargaining. 
 
As we have seen there exist cooperative forums in which the social partners, the 
government and other bodies meet in order to discuss various issues of common 
interest. The topic of gender equality and equal pay, features in some of these 
discussions. Yet there is no single forum that comprehensively takes on the 
issue of equal pay. This section forwards the recommendation that the Equality 
and anti-discrimination Ombud should take an active role as an advisor on the 
legal requirements of the principle of equal pay, to be used by the social 
partners within the collective bargaining system. This would take the form of an 
equal pay forum, in which primarily the Ombud and the social partners 
participate. The aim of the forum would be to clarify, from a legal perspective, 
what the principle of equal pay for work of equal value requires in the context 
of the activities of the social partners. This could ultimately have a positive 
impact on how pay equality is reflected in wage settlements. The following 
sections elaborate on and account for the principle features of this 
recommendation.  
 
6.2.  Why the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value? 
 
In short, this recommendation proposes advising the social partners on the legal 
requirements of the equal pay principle. As such, it is the equal pay principle 
itself that forms the basic tool in this recommendation.  An effort has been 
made throughout this paper to illustrate that the principle of equal pay is of 
relevance to addressing the gender wage gap in Norway, where women are 
concentrated in jobs that are paid less relative to male dominated jobs. 
Therefore only the most relevant points will be restated here. As we have seen 
in Chapter Three and Four, the wage difference between female and male 
dominated work can in certain circumstances be considered discriminatory and 
contrary to the principle of equal pay. This is why the equal pay principle can 
be a useful tool in addressing the gender wage gap in Norway.  
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Objective job evaluation is a method, which forms a component of the principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value and is intended to establish the relative 
value of jobs without gender bias. This exercise forms an important starting 
point in addressing gender wage differences that follow gender segregation in 
the labour market as it opens up the possibility of comparing the wages of 
typical female work and typical male work, which is often very different in 
character, and challenge any presumptions that less value should be accorded to 
typically female work. The skills required for a job cannot be attributed less 
value based on the assumption that they form an inevitable part of a woman’s 
nature. The provision of care for humans, for example, in professions such as 
teaching or nursing, must be evaluated in an objective way and this exercise 
must be rigorous enough to challenge historical perceptions of the value of 
traditionally female work. As we have seen from the case law of the Ombud 
and Tribunal, a nurse can be considered to be performing work of equal value 
to an engineer when the content of those jobs are evaluated objectively and 
without gender bias.    
 
The reach of comparison of the equal pay principle is broad and allows 
comparison to take place between completely different jobs, across 
occupational borders and collective bargaining agreements. Its scope is 
therefore broad enough to address wage differences in a very gender segregated 
labour market.    
 
One main reason why many female dominated jobs remain relatively less paid 
is their market value. Employers contend that they, in certain circumstances, 
have legitimate reasons for rewarding unequal pay even though women are 
disproportionately negatively affected. According to the principle of equal pay 
for work of equal value there can be objective reasons that justify unequal pay, 
market value being one of them. Employer organisation KS has expressed that 
wage differences between female and male dominated jobs in the municipal 
sector concern jobs that are either not of the same value or jobs that are of the 
same value but that the difference in pay is in these cases justified by objective 
reasons. However, the principle of equal pay does not seem to support this. 
There are limitations to the use of objective reasons to justify unequal pay. As 
we recall, in the Harstad case the Ombud was not prepared to accept the 
municipality’s market value argument for paying higher wages to engineers 
than to nurses. It reasons that in light of the overall purpose of the equal pay 
principle, market value cannot systematically suppress women from receiving 
equal pay to men when they are performing work that is of equal value. The 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value establishes some limitations for 
when wage differences based on market value justifications can be deemed 
acceptable. 
 
The point to be made is that the principle of equal pay for work of equal value 
provides guidance as to which current wage differences in the Norwegian 
labour market are deemed unacceptable from a legal perspective. Trade union 
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Unio, speaks of valuation discrimination as an equal pay problem. In general 
terms they state that this is when certain professions and sectors reward higher 
wages than others for equally qualified workers. However, it is not specified 
which professions this applies to. The principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value can be seen as a tool to evaluate which wage differences are not 
acceptable from the perspective of the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value. The principle of equal pay for work of equal value is a legal concept and, 
as such, it has a certain accuracy, which the social partners can benefit from. 
Establishing that a wage difference is contrary to the principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value provides more foundation for arguments in wage 
negotiations that something ought to be done with certain persisting gender 
wage differences between female and male dominated professions and provide 
a more accurate picture of which professions this applies to. This could have a 
positive effect on the outcome of wage settlements from an equal pay 
perspective.  
 
6.3. Why collective bargaining? 
As shown in Chapter Five the gender wage gap persists within collective 
bargaining areas. There is thus a portion of the gender wage gap, which 
arguably falls under the responsibility of the social partners, yet only very slow 
progress has been made on the gender wage gap within collective bargaining 
areas. Looking into ways to better address equal pay through collective 
bargaining is thus a worthwhile endeavour.  
 
The freedom of workers and employers to negotiate their own collective 
bargaining agreements is a central principle in Norwegian labour law. Wage 
determination forms part of the central content of collective agreements. It is 
thus these bodies that wield the most influence over the determination of wages 
through the negotiation of collective agreements. Yet, the social partners are 
bound by the Gender Equality Act and hence by the principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value. The social partners are thereby the bodies with the most 
important responsibility for the determination of wages and they are also bound 
to apply the principle of equal pay for work of equal value.  
 
Furthermore, most workers in Norway have their wage determined by 
collective agreements. Not only unionised workers are covered. Employers who 
are bound by collective agreements are obligated to apply the terms of the 
agreement to unionised as well as non-unionised employees. Collective 
agreements thus cover almost the entire working population. A 
recommendation directed at the collective bargaining process, thus has the 
potential to have a significant impact on the gender wage gap. 
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6.4. The complicated web of social partners 
 
The Norwegian collective bargaining system and the model for wage 
determination is complex and involves negotiations between many different 
social partners and at different levels of the organisational structure. 
Agreements can be concluded between different central trade unions and 
employer organisations, between different trade unions and employer 
organisations at industry level or between trade unions and employers at 
company level. Wage can be determined conclusively at the central level or 
conclusively at the company level, or a combination of both. For example, in 
the case of minimum wage agreements, a minimum wage is set at the central 
level and local negotiations take place regarding any additional wage increases. 
There are thus many actors, at different levels in the wage determination system 
that exert influence on wage settlements. These are often linked and have 
consequences for each other. A basic collective agreement between the central 
actors may set the framework for negotiations at a more local level.  
 
Therefore, in order for the recommendation to be effective, the Ombud should 
conduct discussion forums not only with the central trade unions and employer 
organisations but also with social partners at different levels of the 
organisational structure. This would include individual employers and workers 
at company level, especially in cases where wage is determined almost 
exclusively at the local level. This would be no small undertaking and it would 
require a sophisticated organisational effort. Not least, it would be dependent on 
the allocation of a substantial amount of additional resources to the Equality 
and anti-discrimination Ombud.    
 
 
6.5. Why the Equality and anti-discrimination 
Ombud? 
 
It is through their role as a complaints mechanism that the Ombud and the 
Tribunal have developed the current legal practice on the right to equal pay. 
Their decisions, however, are only directly applicable vis-à-vis the parties to the 
case at hand. It is only the National Labour Court that has the authority to 
invalidate provisions of a collective bargaining agreement as a whole. But the 
National Labour Court, having heard only one case concerning pay equality, is 
no authority on this subject. We must therefore still look to the Ombud and 
Tribunal as authorities on this principle.  
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It must be noted that the Norwegian government has paid attention to how the 
relationship between the Labour Court and the Equality and anti-discrimination 
Tribunal is problematic from an equal pay perspective. In the event of the 2002 
reform of the Gender Equality Act, the government explored ways in which to 
strengthen the role of both the Ombud and Tribunal in relation to the validity of 
collective bargaining agreements. One of the suggestions made was that the 
Ombud be granted the power to demand that a case is brought before the 
Labour Court, something only the parties to a collective agreement can do. The 
Ombud would then also have a role in the case proceedings.173 The outcome of 
the discussions, however, fell short of this and the reform landed on was 
granting power to the Tribunal to give reasoned statements regarding the 
legality of a collective bargaining agreement in relation to the Gender Equality 
Act when an individual case gives rise to this issue.   
 
The statements and decisions of the Ombud and Tribunal thus still only have 
direct consequences for the individuals to the case at hand. However, what is 
important to note is that the Ombud and Tribunal, in their capacity as a 
complaints mechanism, develop legal practice and set precedence on the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value. This can be of use also outside 
their role as a complaints mechanism. The complaints mechanism is primarily 
in place to provide recourse when discrimination has already taken place. 
However, the process in which wages are determined in the first place, i.e. 
collective bargaining, can benefit from the legal guidance provided by these 
bodies on the principle of equal pay for work of equal value.  
 
As we recall, the mandate of the Ombud goes beyond the role of a complaints 
body and includes advocacy responsibilities, mainly in the form of providing 
guidance and information on the subject of equality and non-discrimination. On 
the official website of the Ombud a list of responsibilities within their mandate 
as an advocate for equality can be found. Two responsibilities are listed that are 
of particular relevance to this recommendation. Firstly, the Ombud is to provide 
information, support and guidance in the work to promote equality and fight 
discrimination. Secondly, it is to be a forum and information centre that 
facilitates cooperation between different actors in their work to promote 
equality.174  
 
The recommendation proposed, for the Ombud to take an active advisory role 
on the principle of equal pay for work of equal value in a forum between itself 
and the social partners is thus within the Ombud’s mandate.  
 
                                                
173 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.197 
174 Likestillings- og diskrimineringsombudet, Arbeidet vårt, taken from 
<http://www.ldo.no/nyheiter-og-fag/om-ombudet/arbeidet-vart1/> accessed 20 May 2015 
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6.6. Ambiguities in the case law 
 
It must be acknowledged that there are some inconsistencies in the case-law on 
equal pay between the Ombud and the Tribunal that raise some questions for 
the role of the Ombud as a legal advisor on the equal pay principle. One 
concern is whether inconsistencies in the legal practice of the complaints 
mechanism undermine the Ombud’s authority on certain legal questions.  
 
This does not seem to be a problem in regard to objective job evaluation. The 
Ombud and Tribunal have developed a detailed, rigorous and consistent method 
of objective job evaluation. This puts the Ombud in a strong position to provide 
legal guidance on the question of the objective value of different jobs and it can 
use its own as well as the Tribunal’s case law in discussions with the social 
partners. Legal certainty in this area would make it more likely that the social 
partners make use of the Ombud’s advice.      
 
However, and what formed the central analysis in Chapter Four, there is less 
clarity in the case law regarding market value justifications. The Ombud takes a 
strong stance against market value justifications that compromise the purpose 
of the equal pay principle, yet the Tribunal shows unwillingness to challenge 
market value justifications, taking a more conservative approach to interference 
with the freedom of the employer. This leaves the state of the law somewhat 
uncertain in this area and a consequence could be that the Ombud is not able to 
adopt a clear stance on the use of market value justifications or that the stance it 
does adopt will carry less weight in discussions with social partners. For the 
purpose of this recommendation it would be beneficial if the Ombud and the 
Tribunal clarify their legal position on the use of market value justifications.  
 
6.7. Why an “advisory role” approach? 
 
The freedom of workers and employers to negotiate their own collective 
bargaining agreements is a central principle in Norwegian labour law. Although 
the social partners are legally bound by the provisions of the Gender Equality 
Act, an overwhelming compromise of this freedom would, from the perspective 
of the social partners be problematic. This is why an advisory role for the 
Ombud is suggested in this paper, as this does not put any legal restrictions on 
the social partners right to negotiate their own collective bargaining 
agreements.  
 
A discussion forum on the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, in 
which the Ombud has an advisory role, would allow room for the social 
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partners and the Ombud to debate and negotiate the points of law that are more 
ambiguous. An example would be that employer representatives contend that 
the market value principle justifies unequal pay, while worker representatives 
argue that equal pay interests take precedence over market interests. The 
Ombud could provide examples of cases, balancing the interests of the two 
opposing groups and base its positions on an interpretation of the law. The 
social partners would still have final say on the matter in collective bargaining; 
however, clarification of the law during the discussions could be influential and 
carry a lot of weight in final wage negotiations.     
 
This stands in contrast to the objective job evaluation tool FAKIS, mentioned in 
Chapter Two, in which employers would have been obliged to carry out wage 
adjustments following the categorisation of different jobs using an objective job 
evaluation method. This only took into account the objective job evaluation 
stage without consideration of the other elements that factor into the evaluation 
of pay discrimination, for example objective justifications. This 
uncompromising approach led to no wage adjustments at all. The discussion 
forum would not just consider whether two jobs are of equal value based on 
objective job evaluation but examine whether wage differences actually amount 
to pay discrimination contrary to the principle of equal pay, rigorously 
considering all factors that enter into this legal exercise. This would allow room 
for employers to forward arguments based on market value interests or other 
objective reasons they may have for rewarding unequal pay, and these would be 
evaluated based on the legal requirements of the principle of equal pay for work 
of equal value. This more discursive, persuasive form of promoting the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value could ultimately be received 
more favourably by the social partners, especially those forces more sceptical to 
major equal pay changes.  
 
The recommendation proposed in this section can also be distinguished from 
related recommendations forward by the Equal Pay Commission in their 
Gender and Pay report. One of their major recommendations was that the 
public authorities along with the social partners conduct a general wage raise 
for female dominated professions in the public sector. The Commission 
proposed that it would be up to the social partners to decide which trade groups 
would be granted these raises.175 The recommendation proposed in this paper is 
not opposed or irreconcilable with measures aimed at raising the wages in 
female dominated professions. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of an equal pay 
discussion forum is for wages to be raised in low-wage female dominated 
professions when the principle of equal pay demands this. However, the focus 
of my proposal is on providing more clarity on where and when the law 
demands such raises so that the social partners could be more guided in their 
equal pay efforts and conclude wage agreements that are reflective of what the 
principle of equal pay for work of equal value requires.  
                                                
175 NOU 2008:6 Kjønn og Lønn, p.223-224 
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Undeniably, such changes would have significant economic consequences. A 
question that most certainly will have to be grappled with is where economic 
resources to conduct these resulting wage raises are to come from. Is it the 
government or the employer that is to take primary responsibility? Although 
addressing these issues fall beyond the scope of this paper, they are essential 
technicalities that must be dealt with if progress is to be made on the gender 
wage gap in Norway.  
 
The Equal Pay Commission’s proposal mentioned above would be aimed at 
raising the wages of female-dominated professions in the public sector relative 
to the private sector. As such it would be addressing wage differences between 
the public and private sector. As we know, this is something that the domestic 
law on equal pay does not require. The right to equal pay for work of equal 
value is restricted to the same enterprise. Thus the principle of equal pay carries 
a significant limitation. However, the discussion forum proposed, in which the 
Ombud acts as an expert advisor, could be flexible enough to explore and 
challenge this limitation in the law. As we have seen in Chapter Five, trade 
union Unio advocates that wage differences that cut across the public-private 
sector divide should be addressed. The discussion forum could be a setting in 
which social partners can share their views on these questions. Although the 
domestic law is rather clear in its limitation, as we know, it is incompatible with 
international labour standards, which envisages comparison to be able to take 
place also between different enterprises and as such between private and public 
employment. The Ombud could contribute guidance not just on the domestic 
law, but also on what international labour law, European Unions Law or other 
sources of law demand in relation to equal pay. This could have the potential of 
being the starting point in encouraging reform of this limitation in the domestic 
law or indeed developing the legal principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value in domestic law, more generally.  
 
Key arguments in support of an advisory role for the Equality and anti-
discrimination Ombud on the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, to 
provide expert advise that can be used by the social partners within the system 
of collective bargaining, have been forwarded in this chapter. The author 
thereby hopes to have communicated that, although this recommendation would 
require a sophisticated organisational effort and undoubtedly place a significant 
demand on financial resources, it would be a worthwhile undertaking with the 
potential of having a substantial impact on the gender wage gap in Norway.  
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